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International Boundary Commission
"Good fences make good neighbors."
Robert Frost, Mending Wall.1
I. INTRODUCTION

If you gaze along the international boundary that separates the United
States from Canada in any forested area, it will appear simply as a
twenty-foot cleared swath of land stretching from horizon to horizon,
"dotted in a regular pattern" with little white monuments. 2 The scale of
the boundary is immense.
"Over mountains, down cliffs, along
waterways and through prairie grasses, the line snakes . . . 5,525 miles
across North America, tranquil, undefended but not uncared for."3 The
line is not merely symbolic; it is practical. "For the proper enforcement
of customs, immigration, fishing, and other laws" of the United States
and Canada, "[t]he boundary vista must be entirely free of obstruction
and plainly marked.",4 The job of maintaining this cleared vista-the
task of "mowing the grass" 5-falls to the International Boundary
Commission ("IBC" or "Commission"). A 1908 treaty created the
Commission for one purpose: "the complete reestablishment and
mapping" of the boundary from the Atlantic coast to the shores of the
Pacific. 6 The United States and Canada created the IBC during the era
of Teddy Roosevelt and Progressive reforms as the age of Taylorism
and scientific administration finally came to U.S.-Canadian relations
with its focus on impartiality and expertise in bureaucratic decision7
making.
But, created to avoid controversies, the IBC has recently been at the
center of one. Despite the undeniable success of the Commission as it
enters its second century, a recent dispute over a small retaining fence in
Washington State and President Bush's subsequent removal of the U.S.
Commissioner to the IBC have led to bold claims on both sides of the
1. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33, 33 (Edward
Connery Lathem ed., 1979).
2. International
Boundary
Commission,
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/boundary.html#history (last visited Nov. 27,
2008).
3. L.M. BLOOMFIELD & GERALD F. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS OF
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (1958).
4. Id. Indeed between 2001 and 2006, 56,883 people were caught trying to illegally cross the
border from Canada into the United States. Barry Newman, As for Canada Finding the Border is
a Bit of a Trick, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2007, at Al.
5. Newman, supra note 4.

6.
7.

BLOOMFIELD & FITZGERALD, supra note 3.
JOHN HERD THOMPSON & STEPHEN J. RANDALL, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES:

AMBIVALENT ALLIES 74 (3d ed. 2002).
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controversy. While the rhetoric over the Commissioner's firing has not
reached the level of that over the first U.S. commission on boundaries
under the Jay Treaty, 8 after which Republicans burned effigies of "that
damned arch-traitor, John Jay," 9 both sides have claimed that the
dispute touches upon the heart of the Constitution, foreign affairs, and
international law.
Defenders of President Bush's firing of the
Commissioner have cited the necessity of unitary government and the0
centrality of private property rights in American democracy.'
Advocates for the now unemployed Commissioner have successfully
demonstrated that, for the first time in American history, the President
has unilaterally removed a member of a bilateral, international treaty
body.'1 They have further claimed that this oversteps the President's
constitutional and statutory prerogative, in addition to undermining
international U.S. commitments that have stood for more than a
century. 12 It seems that the Boundary Commission as lightning rod has
become ungrounded.
At the root of the conflict is confusion about the role and structure of
the IBC itself and a lack of readily-available information about the
Commission's history. Before this recent controversy there had never
been an occasion for a court to decide whether the IBC was a part of the
governments of the United States and Canada or an independent
international organization. In addition, no book or journal article
focusing on the IBC has been written in either legal or historical
scholarship.13 So, while the history of the IBC and the treaties creating
it are opaque, analyzing the present dispute provides an occasion to
examine both the President's removal power as well as questions of
8. See infra notes 51-66.
9.

FRANK MONAGHAN, JOHN JAY 388-89, 400 (1935).

10. The Pacific Legal Foundation's (PLF's) attorney, Brian Hodges, claimed that the dispute
is "about a little-known agency that was enacted basically to mow the lawn of the boundary
...[that claims it] can come into the U.S. and take away private property without any recourse,
without even the president having any authority to stop them." Jeff Kart, Essexville Native at
Heart of InternationalCase, BAY CITY TIMES (Mich.), Nov. 9, 2007, at A3.

11. Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
12. Schornack's attorney claimed, "The story is that the President of the United States has
attempted to expand his authority significantly by asserting dominion over an international
organization and trying to bring it back into the control of the United States." Kart, supra note
10.
13. The possible exceptions are the IBC's publications themselves, but they are dominated by
graphical materials and field reports, and they focus on the actual, contemporaneous project of
mapping the boundary rather than the history of the IBC. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
COMMISSION, REESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA NORTHWESTERNMOST POINT OF LAKE OF THE WOODS TO LAKE SUPERIOR (1931)

(reporting the results of the boundary mapping project between Lake of the Woods and Lake
Superior as required by the 1908 and 1925 Treaties).
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international law and U.S. foreign policy relating to treaties and the
President's ability to unilaterally disregard them. 14 The confluence of
these questions also relates to theories of constitutional law and
international law generally: whether and to what extent an expansive
removal power is foundational and necessary to the unitary executive;
why countries do or do not follow international legal norms and what
are the reputational consequences of such decisions; whether it is
desirable to have politically insulated, scientifically-grounded
bureaucrats making administrative decisions that have an undeniable
political component? These questions are particularly salient as they
topical intersection of international and
implicate the "increasingly
15
constitutional law."
It is a difficult question to ask whether there is cause for concern if
the President invokes a broad removal power that seems contrary to a
nearly century-old international commitment. As the first court to
examine the IBC removal case bemoaned, "The Court is asked to decide
these matters with little historical guidance: it appears that no President
' 16
has ever attempted to fire the head of a treaty-based organization."
There is an obvious, unresolved tension between the United States'
ability to enter into and abide by its treaties that are the "supreme law of
the land," 17 and the claim that the President must retain an unfettered
ability to remove virtually anyone that he considers an officer in the
In broad terms, if a conflict between a
U.S. Government. 18
constitutional command and the dictate of a treaty exists, the

14. Even the doctrine underlying this dispute, the removal power, is often contested in legal
scholarship.
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70 (1994) ("No one has suggested the President has [the
power to divest state officers of powers], and we know of no example of any President purporting
to exercise it."); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The
Unitary Executive in the Modem Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605-07 (2005)
(discussing president's role as a unitary executive). It is widely accepted that the President has
broad removal authority; however, the Supreme Court has recognized outer-limits to the removal
power. See discussion infra Part IIB.
15. Ilya Shapiro, Medellifn v. Texas and the Ultimate Law School Exam, 2008 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 63, 63 (2008).
16. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
2.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
18. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH passim (2008) (discussing a continuous
debate in U.S. constitutional law regarding the scope of president's power to remove his
subordinates); CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 22 (2d ed. 1960) ("The
President has the responsibility ... for the personnel policies and the personnel management of
the Federal Government. This leadership must be accepted and exercised by the President, if the
business of the National Government is to be efficiently performed.").
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Constitution clearly wins. 19 In other words, to the extent that the
Constitution limits the President's removal power, whatever a treaty
says about the removal may matter for international law but is relatively
unimportant as a matter of U.S. constitutional law. The tension remains
present, however, when a limitation on the President's removal power
falls within the type of limitation that is arguably permissible under the
20
Constitution.
This Article seeks to resolve the remaining tension. It claims that the
1908 and 1925 Treaties creating the IBC are self-executing international
agreements that act as a limitation on unfettered presidential removal of
the U.S. Commissioner. While it concedes that the President may be
able to evade these limitations by terminating the Treaties, it claims that
he cannot profess to follow an agreement that limits removal while
simultaneously effecting a removal that violates the Treaties. 2 1 More
broadly, the Article uses the IBC and the removal issue to leverage two
more far-reaching discussions.
First, by claiming that the IBC
Commissioner's removal may violate U.S. law, thus exceeding the
scope of the removal power, the Article reminds that the touchstone
questions in removal power jurisprudence involve separation of
powers-and
accompanying
values
of
accountability
and
independence-rather than dogmatic insistence on almost-unlimited
removal power. 2 2 Second, the practical rejection of the boundary
treaties provides occasion for a normative discussion of U.S. policy on
treaty commitments as well as a threat to agency independence more
generally. 2 3 To this end, the Article claims that the U.S. acting
unilaterally to alter terms of a treaty-particularly by relying on a
strained interpretation of the Article II power-weakens the
international rule of law and damages U.S. "reputation" as that term is
24
used in international legal scholarship.
19.

E.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 298 (2005).

20. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988) (holding that appointment of
the independent counsel to investigate misconduct in the executive branch did not "impermissibly
interfere with the President's authority under Article II in violation of the constitutional principle
of separation of powers"); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935)
(stating that it was the legislative intent to limit the President's "illimitable power of removal"
only to executive officers); see also David C. Weiss, Note, Nothing Improper? Examining
ConstitutionalLimits, CongressionalAction, PartisanMotivation, and PretextualJustification in
the United States Attorney Removals, 107 MICH. L. REV. 317, 335-40 (2008) (questioning
whether President Bush's firing of U.S. attorneys passed constitutional muster).
21. See infra notes 489-94, 501-05.
22. See infra notes 489-94, 499-503.
23. See infra notes 495-500, 507-18.
24.

See generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL

CHOICE THEORY (2008) (discussing compliance and effectiveness in international law).
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Part II recovers the history of the IBC before describing the
President's removal of the U.S. Commissioner. Part III uses removal
power principles and Supreme Court jurisprudence to argue that
insulation of the IBC from political removal, in favor of expertise in
decisionmaking, can pass constitutional muster. It claims that the U.S.
Commissioner could clearly be insulated from presidential removal if he
is not an officer of the United States. It then argues that if the
Commissioner is such an officer, which he likely is, he is an inferior
officer for whom constitutionally permissible removal limitations can
be created by treaty. Part IV further examines the history of the 1908
and 1925 Treaties and the Supreme Court's pronouncements on self25
executing treaties, including the recent decision in Medellin v. Texas,
and concludes that the 1908 and 1925 Treaties establishing the IBC are
self-executing and have the force of U.S. law. It then argues that the
Treaties specifically insulate the IBC Commissioner from political
removals to the extent that the Constitution allows such insulation. Part
V concedes that the fired Commissioner, given the circumstances of his
removal, may lack a cause of action to challenge his dismissal.
However, in arguing that the firing highlights important structural,
administrative, and constitutional issues, Part V reasserts that the treatylimited interpretation of the removal power is faithful to the
Constitution by serving values of separation of powers and prevention
of both executive and congressional aggrandizement. Finally, Part V
claims that such an interpretation simultaneously serves the normative
goals of U.S. foreign policy as well as international law by promoting
the international rule of law, respecting treaty commitments, and
furthering a positive international "reputation."
II. THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY COMMISSION AND ITS PLACE IN THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT
The IBC enjoys reporting that it has been "maintaining a peaceful
boundary for more than a century." 2 6 While the U.S.-Canadian border
was a source of disagreement and required frequent diplomatic efforts
for many years, in recent decades there has been almost no conflict over
the border. Even when the IBC was created, however, armed conflict
appeared less likely than in previous years, and boundary issues were
already starting to become less intractable. 27 During the time period in

25. 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
26. International
Boundary
Commission,
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/index-eng.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2008).
27.

THOMPSON & RANDALL, supra note 7, at 73.
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which the IBC was beginning to take shape, the British Ambassador in
Washington, James Bryce, commented about a minor island along the
Maine-New Brunswick boundary: "[A] century ago, it might
conceivably have been . . . a spot on which to construct a small fort ....
Today no use could be made of it except to erect a tiny summer cottage
or perhaps an afternoon tea house."28 During the same three decades
that it took the IBC to coalesce into its present form, diplomats,
including Secretary of State Elihu Root, Canadian Governor General
Earl Grey, and Ambassador Bryce, negotiated eight treaties and
agreements to manage a number of contentious issues on cross-border
29
water management, international borders, and boundary maintenance.
Specifically, along with the IBC, in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries the United States-as part of Theodore Roosevelt's
"wider vision of continental cooperation"-was involved in negotiating
the creation of a separate IBC for the U.S.-Mexican border, the
International Boundary and Water Commission, and the International
Joint Commission, among others. 30 These developments took place
during a time of U.S. international political cooperation not seen again
until the end of the Cold War. 3 1 A frequent motivation for this
cooperation was an effort to depoliticize boundary issues, relying
instead upon technical expertise. 3 2 Yet in 2007, the saga of the firstever fired IBC Commissioner, Dennis Schornack, was rife with claims
of politicization and party loyalty. Understanding the limits of the
removal power over the U.S. Commissioner to the IBC requires an
analysis of the intersection of these two divergent stories. Section II.A
details the present structure of the IBC and its history in arguing that the
U.S. Commissioner and his staff are a part of the U.S. Government.
Section II.B discusses the story of Commissioner Schornack and the
related litigation.
A. The InternationalBoundary Commission
As described by former IBC Commissioner Schornack in referring to
the IBC, "[I]t's not glamorous. It's not high-tech. It's chain saws and
weed whackers . . . . The boundary has been ignored for a very long

28. Id.
29. International
Boundary
Commission,
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/centennial.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2008).
30. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ON NORTH AMERICA'S BORDERS 13-14 (Richard Kiy &
John D. Wirth eds., 1998).
31. Id.
32. THOMPSON & RANDALL, supra note 7, at 74.
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time .... I'm not even sure people know we exist." 33 While the people
Commissioner Schornack was describing were neither legal nor
historical academics, they could have been. Just as the IBC "gets lost"
in national budgeting, 34 there is little reference to the IBC and no
substantive legal discussion of it in any published scholarship. In
addition to describing the IBC as it functions today, this Section
recovers, reports, and consolidates the history of the formation of the
IBC.
1. The Role of the International Boundary Commission Today
The IBC is "a permanent international organization whose sole
concern is the physical maintenance of a line that separates two national
sovereignties," a task which it undertakes through a variety of
mechanisms. Demarcating and maintaining the boundary has been the
IBC's treaty mandate since 1908. 35 The IBC primarily clears brush and
builds small monuments, creating a physical border between the United
States and Canada. 36 The IBC performs operational, regulatory,
advisory, and custodial tasks. 37 Operational tasks include the actual
clearing of the border and erecting of monuments, the vast majority of
the IBC's time and budget. 38 The IBC's regulatory tasks include
regulating any construction that might affect the border vista and
interpreting outstanding border questions that may arise. 39
By
presidential proclamation in the United States and statutory authority in
Canada under the International Boundary Commission Act of 1960, a
swath of land twenty feet across is under the control of the IBC. 40 The
advisory tasks are, for example, advising the respective governments on
the minor, still unsettled border areas in the Gulf of Maine and along the
Alaskan border. 4 1 Finally, the IBC performs custodial tasks relating to
33. David Sharp, Vegetation Snarls CanadianBorder, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 1, 2006, at A9.
34. Id.
35. Alec McEwen, The Value of International Boundary Commissions: The
Canadian/American Experience, Address Presented by the Canadian Boundary Commissioner at
the University of Durham Conference on International Boundary Management, at I (Sept. 2001),
http://www.ucalgary.ca/-amcewen/ibc.pdf [hereinafter McEwen Address].
36. Id.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. Operational tasks may also include occasionally accompanying police operating near
the border to confirm in which country a suspect was apprehended. Id.
39. Id.
40. Proclamation, President William H. Taft, 37 Stat. 1741 (May 3, 1912); Proclamation,
President Theodore Roosevelt, 35 Stat. 2189 (June 15, 1908); International Boundary
Commission Act, R.S.C., c. 1-16 (1985) (Can.).
41. See McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 5 (illustrating that either government may request
that its own Conmissioner provide it with confidential research concerning the offshore
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which
the reports, maps, and positional data that define the boundary,
42
purposes."
legal
for
evidence
cartographic
serve as "conclusive
The organizational structure of the IBC that the 1925 Treaty finalized
is essentially the same as its structure today. The IBC is a bilateral
treaty organization that maintains separate headquarters in Ottawa and
Washington, D.C. 43 For administrative purposes, however, the IBC is
in many ways located within federal agencies, 44 which is a complication
that the recent removal controversy has exposed as creating the IBC's
uncertain status. Canada appoints its commissioner by "order-incouncil, although the incumbent is also a full-time employee of the
The President appoints the U.S.
federal public service." 4 5
Commissioner, and in recent years U.S. Commissioners have vacated
46
the office soon after a change of presidential administration.
However, more contemporaneously with the 1908 and 1925 Treaties,
the commissioner typically remained in office much longer than one
47
administration.
Administratively, the size and budget of the IBC is reflected in its
relatively subdued management. The Commissioners meet twice each
year at formal conferences to review the season's operations and plan
for the 'next year. 4 8 They also have at least one field visit each year
during which they inspect the IBC's field work. 49 The field work is
normally allocated according to the Commission's fifteen-year plans,
which keep the boundary vista clear by scheduling maintenance.
However, the field work is typically performed by only one party from a
single national section of the Commission, though the two sides
50
exchange survey data and office computations following each season.
boundaries).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. The Canadian commissioner is administratively "part of the Department of Natural
ld.
I..."
Resources, from which it receives its accommodation, human resources, and budget .
45. Id.
46. Id.' see also Press Release, U.S. State Dept., No. 350, U.S. and Spain Begin Negotiations
for New Extradition Treaty (Nov. 20, 1969), reprinted in 61 DEP'T ST. BULL. 588 (1969).
47.

See INT'L JOINT COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ON

THE LAKE OF THE WOODS REFERENCE 140 & n.2 (1917) (describing that the boundary treaty of
1908 provided that commissioners would be charged with demarcation and marking of the
boundary); THOMPSON & RANDALL, supra note 7, at 73 (stating that some commissioners have
served lengthy terms in order to provide necessary continuity); Named on Boundary Commission,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1929, at 6 (naming a successor to the late E. Lester Jones who had served the
International Boundary Commission for nineteen years.).
48. See McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 3 (stating that the commissioners meet twice a
year with the senior officers to go over past season's results and discuss future plans).
49. Id.
50. Id.

International Boundary Commission
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While the description above is necessary to understand the IBC as it
operates today, to more closely examine the removal of Dennis
Schornack and the President's removal authority over the U.S.
Commissioner, it is necessary to examine both the history and authority
that underlies the IBC. While little controversy has arisen surrounding
the IBC since the 1925 Treaty, which set it up as currently comprised,
this may be a testament to the success of the design that the Treaty
created. Certainly in the years, decades, and centuries preceding the
current constitution of the IBC, issues and relationships were more
acrimonious.
2. The History of the International Boundary Commission
The IBC can trace its history to a number of predecessor agreements
and bodies that, eventually, led to the creation of the IBC itself. The
first such agreement was the Jay Treaty of 1794. 5 1 Following the
Revolutionary War, U.S.-Great Britain relations were characterized by
"old problems, aggravated by fresh grievances" arising from disputes
over the implementation of the Treaty of Paris. 5 2 The tensions over
western and eastern borders, relations with the Indians and control of
the fur trade, and Great Britain's refusal to negotiate a commercial
treaty with its former colony, created a tense backdrop for transatlantic
relations. 53 After multiple confrontations, it was clear to Federalist
leaders in Philadelphia that a peaceful settlement was needed to avoid
another war. 5 4 President Washington nominated John Jay as the treaty
negotiator,5 5 and in May 1794, Jay sailed for Britain, possessing nearly
56
as much discretion as has been held by such an envoy in U.S. history.
After more than four months of negotiation, 57 the parties signed the
treaty on November 19, 1794.58 In addition to key strategic and
commercial issues, the Jay Treaty, as it came to be known in the United
States, 59 addressed a number of unresolved boundary issues from the

51. See Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat.
116 [hereinafter The Jay Treaty] (regulating commerce and navigation between the two
countries).
52. MONAGHAN, supra note 9, at 361.
53. See id. at 361-62 (discussing Great Britain's refusal to negotiate any commercial treaty
with the United States).
54. Id. at 363-64,
55. Id. at 367.
56. Id. at 368, 370.
57. See id. at 373-80 (describing John Jay's negotiations with the British officials).
58. The Jay Treaty, supra note 51.
59.

See WILLIAM WHITELOCK, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN JAY 264-68 (New

York, Dodd, Mead, & Co. 1887) (describing difficulties John Jay faced in negotiating

the treaty).
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Revolutionary War. 60 The Treaty created a three-person commission to
identify the source of the St. Croix River, 6 1 which still separates Maine
from New Brunswick today. 62 It also included the designation of three
commissioners whose decisions would be "final and conclusive" on the
two countries, 63 essentially the first international boundary
commission. 64 The Treaty called for the commissioners to "be Sworn
impartially to examine and decide" boundary issues. 65
Many
commentators regard the placement of these decisions in the hands of
the commission as the first modern example of international
66
adjudication.
The Jay Treaty was not, however, the only precursor to the IBC; there
were at least three significant boundary commission agreements
between it and the creation of the IBC. First, following the War of
1812, the United States and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Ghent,
which set up a series of border commissions, this time with two
commissioners, one appointed by his Britannic Majesty and one
appointed by the President. 67 The Treaty, which is typically referred to
as the "treaty of boundaries," 68 used language modeled after the Jay
Treaty, and the parties "agree[d] to consider [the commissioners']
decision as final and conclusive." 69 Second, in the nineteenth century, a
60. See The Jay Treaty, supra note 51, art. V (discussing formation of the boundary between
the United States and Great Britain).

61.

The commission is thus commonly referred to as the St. Croix Commission. HENRY S.

BURRAGE, MAINE INTHE NORTHEASTERN BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY 42 (1919).

62. The Jay Treaty, supra note 51, art. V.
63.

Id. See also BURRAGE, supra note 61, at 44-45 (noting a letter from Secretary of State

Timothy Pickering to James Sullivan, the American advocate before the St. Croix Commission, in
which Pickering emphasized that great care be taken in the advocacy before the St. Croix
commission because the commission's decision "is to befinal").
64. See KAIYAN HOMi KAIKOBAD, INTERPRETATION AND REVISION OF INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY DECISIONS 60-62 (2007) (stating that "the major watershed in the history" of the

international boundary "dispute settlement process must be defined by the conclusion of the Jay
Treaty").
65. The Jay Treaty, supra note 51, art. V.
66. McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 2.
67. Treaty of Peace and Amity, Between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of
America, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. 4-7, 8, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218 [hereinafter Treaty of Ghent]; see
also FRANK A. UPDYKE, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1812, at 318 (1915) (suggesting that

the British advanced the two-commissioner model hoping that the commissioners would be
unable to agree and that the dispute would thus, under Article 4, be decided by a "friendly
sovereign or state" more likely to favor the British).
68. UPDYKE, supra note 67, at 421 ("Five of the eleven articles, covering more than two thirds
of the text, were concerned with provisions for the establishment and operation of boundary
commissions.").
69. Treaty of Ghent, supra note 67; see also BURRAGE, supra note 61, at 87-91 (describing

the horse-trading between the commissioners acting under their authority of the Treaty of Ghent
and the way in which they made their decision and then reported the final boundary to the
President); UPDYKE, supra note 67, at 420 (describing conditions the two countries consented to
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number of ad hoc commissions were formed to address border issues
with respect to the Passamaquoddy Bay (between Maine and New
Brunswick),7 ° the St. Lawrence River, and the Great Lakes, and some of
these commissions possessed the binding power to delimit the location
of the border. 7 1 Finally, only five years before the 1908 Treaty, the
United States and Great Britain signed a treaty in an effort to tackle
boundary issues related to Alaska. 7 2 The treaty created a tribunal of "six
impartial jurists of repute" who were-like the other agreementsempowered to weigh evidence and make decisions as to objects
73
blocking the border.
It was against this backdrop of ad hoc commissions and more than
fifty years of border disputes that the United States and Great Britain
entered into a treaty in 1908 creating the IBC. 7 4 The border disputes of
the nineteenth century-in particular the Aroostook War in which
thousands of American troops, mostly Mainers, marched on the MaineNew Brunswick border in response to a border altercation in that
region-illustrated the threat, which almost certainly seemed more real
in 1908 than today, that U.S.-Canadian border disputes had the potential
to lead to real conflict. 75 Even if all-out war was unlikely, delimiting a
clear "buffer strip" had benefits for travel, commerce, and transportation
and was an effort to settle an issue that had resulted in "frequent
trouble." 7 6 While the Jay Treaty and its progeny had failed to finally
settle the boundary, this "failure to define the line of demarcation" was
due more to "inability" of the ad hoc commissions rather than the

under the treaty such as establishment of mixed courts).
70. See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 63-64 (1898) (explaining

that although the commissioners were able to agree on a report "by which all the islands in the
possession of each party before the late war have been decreed to it," they did not make any
determination to mark the water boundary).
71. McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 2.
72. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain Providing for the Settlement of
Questions Between the Two Countries with Respect to the Boundary Line Between the Territory
of Alaska and the British Possessions in North America, U.S.-G.B., Jan. 24, 1903, 32 Stat. 1961
[hereinafter Alaska Boundary Treaty].
73. Id.
74. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom Concerning
the Boundary Between the United States and the Dominion of Canada From the Atlantic Ocean to
the Pacific Ocean, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Apr. 11, 1908, 35 Stat. 2003 [hereinafter 1908 Treaty]; see also
BURRAGE, supra note 61, at 304 (On the length of the disagreement over the border since the
Treaty of Paris, Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, remarked: "A very promising condition
of things to exist fifty-seven years after the conclusion of the treaty!").
75.

See AROOSTOOK WAR:

HISTORICAL SKETCH AND

ROSTERS

OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN 3-8 (1904) (describing the Aroostook War).
76. Neutral Zone Established,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1908, at 1.
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"neglect" of the previous treaty framers to settle the boundary on
77
paper.
The IBC itself began informally as a series of small agreements prior
to 1908 to perform specific border work. In 1900 the Privy Council of
Canada adopted a report, which proposed that the U.S. and Canadian
governments "join in making an examination of and in re-marking the
whole of the southern boundary of Canada, wherever it has been
surveyed by the various commissions appointed for that purpose." 7 8 In
1901, when arrangements were made for demarcating New York's
northern boundary, the Canadian government expressed its interest in
continuing the process along the northern New England borders. 79 By
1903 the State Department was seeking appropriations for boundary
work in the West. 80 Simultaneously, officials of both governments
reached an agreement providing for the demarcation of the boundary in
a number of border states. 8 1 After such projects in Vermont, the
Secretary of State requested an additional $20,000 for border
82
demarcation between the Rocky Mountains and the St. Croix River.
By 1907, it was clear that because of these considerable, though ad
hoc, boundary activities, "the remainder of the northern land boundary
should be remarked and that proper reference marks should be placed
along the water boundary." 83 The government in Ottawa indicated that
it was tiring of negotiating each border with ad hoc commissions or
state governments, 84 and the U.S. Government took steps to address the
issue. In February 1908 the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, William
Bryce, traveled to Canada to discuss a boundary treaty. 85 The idea of a
boundary treaty was part of a set of larger border-related issues that also
included fisheries concerns and Great Lakes water issues.8 6 As the
Washington Post reported, if the British officials approved of Bryce's
77. See Editorial, Fixing Our Northern Boundary, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 12, 1908,
at 8.
78. INT'L BOUNDARY COMM'N, JOINT REPORT UPON THE SURVEY AND DEMARCATION OF
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FROM THE GULF OF GEORGIA TO
THE NORTHWESTERNMOST POINT OF LAKE OF THE WOODS, at xiv (1937).

79. LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH THE UNITED
STATES PARTICIPATES 190-91 (1935).
80. H.R. DOC. NO. 58-454, at 1-2 (1904); H.R. Doc. NO. 58-50, at 1-2 (1903).
81. See SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 79, at 190-91 (describing that the Canadian government
wanted to continue demarcation of the northern borders of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine
along with arrangements to remark the northern boundary of New York).
82. H.R. DOC. NO. 59-328, at 1-2 (1906).
83. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 79, at 191.
84. WILLIAM R. WILLOUGHBY, THE JOINT ORGANIZATIONS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 7 (1979).
85. Bryce Goes to Canada,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1908, at 1.
86. Bryce Going to Canada,WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1908, at 2.
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submitted to
efforts on these three fronts, "a treaty will be signed and
87
the Senate soon after Mr. Bryce's return to Washington."
On April 11, 1908, the United States and Great Britain signed a
"Convention . . . relating to the Canadian international boundary"
("1908 Treaty") in Washington. 88 As the Boston Daily Globe reported,
the 1908 Treaty provided "for the more complete definition and
demarcation of the boundary between the United States and Canada, but
does not change in any way the understood existing line." 89 Unlike the
bitter, party-line debate over the Jay Treaty, 90 the Senate easily ratified
the 1908 Treaty on May 4, 1908. The 1908 Treaty set the boundary
from the Passamaquoddy Bay to the Pacific Ocean. 9 1 Importantly, to
settle detailed border issues, the 1908 Treaty was purposefully
technocratic, depoliticizing the boundary and requiring the parties "to
appoint, without delay, an expert geographer or surveyor to serve as
92
Commissioners."
For the purposes of this Article, the key portion of the 1908 Treaty
was Article IX, which dealt with "General provisions" and included the
set of situations for the replacement of Commissioners:
In case a vacancy occurs in any of the Commissions constituted by
this Treaty, by reason of the death, resignation, or other disability of a
Commissioner, before the work of such Commission is completed, the
vacancy so caused shall be filled forthwith by the appointment of another Commissioner by the party on whose side the vacancy occurs,
and the Commissioner so appointed shall have the same powers and
duties and obligations as the Commissioner
be subject to the same
93
originally appointed.
Article IX also explained that expenses were to be borne equally
between the two parties, and if the Commissioners could not agree on
of the boundary," then a
the "location or demarcation of any portion
94
neutral arbitrator would decide the dispute.
The work of the Commissioners authorized under the 1908 Treaty
was deemed a success, and by 1925 the parties recognized that the IBC
needed to be established as a permanent body. While the issue of the
U.S.-Canadian boundary was still controversial, 95 the desire to establish
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
See 1908 Treaty, supra note 74.
Boundary Treaty is Law, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, May 5, 1908, at 9.
MONAGHAN, supra note 9, at 389-90.
1908 Treaty, supra note 74, arts. I-VIII.
Id. arts. I-II.
Id. art. IX.
Id.
Id. arts. I-VIT; Treaties with Canada Signed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1925, at 9.
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a permanent IBC reflected a sentiment that "[a]nything which tends to
cause friction with our northern neighbor is to be deplored."'96 Thus, on
February 24, 1925, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and Ernest
La Ponte, Minister of Justice of Canada, signed the "Treaty between the
United States and Great Britain in respect of boundary between the
United States and Canada" ("1925 Treaty").9 7 On March 13, 1925,
Senator William Borah announced that the Senate had ratified the
Treaty in executive session. 9 8 The 1925 Treaty dealt with the three
remaining border issues that the 1908 Treaty had not settled.9 9 It also
made the commission established by the 1908 Treaty permanent. 10 0 As
to the appointment and removal of Commissioners, it provided:
After the completion of the survey and demarcation of the boundary
line between the United States and the Dominion of Canada

. .

. as

provided for by the Treaty of April 11, 1908, the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of that Treaty shall continue to carry out
the provisions of this Article, and, upon the death, resignation, or other
disability of either of them, the Party on whose side the vacancy occurs shall appoint an Expert Geographer or Surveyor as Commissioner, who shall have the same powers and duties in respect to carrying out the provisions of this Article, as are conferred by this Article
upon the Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the said
Treaty of 1908.101
Finally, the 1925 Treaty required that the IBC issue periodic reports,
mandated that its costs be split equally by the two governments, 10 2 and
allowed the parties to withdraw from the Treaty after six years upon
giving notice to the other party, which would disband the IBC. 10 3 By
addressing the three major remaining border issues and establishing a
permanent Commission to settle future disputes and maintain the border
vista, the 1925 Treaty thus "complet[ed] the boundary one hundred and
' 10 4
forty-two years-and four treaties-after the original delimitation."

96.

Op-Ed., A Pleafor Conciliation,WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1925, at 1.

97. See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain in Respect of Boundary Between
the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Feb. 24, 1925, 44 Stat. 2102 [hereinafter 1925
Treaty]; U.S. and CanadaSign Lake of the Woods Treaties, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1925, at 11.

98. See Boundary Treaty Ratified, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1925, at 2 (containing the statement
of Idaho Senator Borah).
99. See 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, arts. I-III. These three remaining disputes were, first,
from the western shore of Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods; second, from the Lake of the
Woods to the summit of the Rocky Mountains; and third, in the area of Passamaquoddy Bay. Id.
100. See id. art. IV.
101. Id.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. art. V.

104. STEPHEN B. JONES, BOUNDARY-MAKING: A HANDBOOK FOR STATESMEN, TREATY
EDITORS AND BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS 3 (1945).
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B. The Removal of CommissionerDennis Schornack
Dennis Schornack's first six years as the U.S. Commissioner to the
IBC were typical of the relatively harmonious Commission. President
Bush appointed Schornack to the IBC in April 2001.105 Weeks later
Bush also appointed him as a Commissioner to the International Joint
Commission, 10 6 an independent, binational treaty organization that the
United States and Canada established under the International Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909.107 The first six years of Schornack's time at the
IBC were characterized by the usual work of the Commission, though
perhaps with heightened attention and focus on border issues due to the
desire for border integrity following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
This period of tranquility at the IBC changed in January 2007 when
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police alerted Schornack and his
Canadian counterpart, Peter Sullivan, about a concrete wall-the wall
was 4-feet high, 85-feet long, and U-shaped-that jutted 30 inches into
the 10-foot vista on the U.S. side of the border. 10 8 Shirley and Herbert
Leu owned the wall, which was built to stop erosion at their home in
Blaine, Washington. In February 2007, Schornack wrote the Leus a
letter explaining that the wall encroached on the twenty-foot boundary
vista and that it would have to be removed to comply with the 1908 and
1925 Treaties. 10 9 The Leus refused to remove the wall, and according
to Schornack, he and Commissioner Sullivan "couldn't figure out how
to grant an exception" to the vista intrusion without violating the
Treaties. 110 The IBC offered to pay for the removal,1 11 but when the
Leus refused, Schornack sent them a letter stating that "the commission
may itself cause the wall to be removed and the expenses for the
removal will be invoiced to you."' 1 12 The Leus again refused to remove
the wall and instead threatened suit, causing the IBC to seek legal

counsel.

113

105. Sara Jean Green, Judge Upholds Firing of Boundary Official, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14,
2007, at B3.
106. Id.
107. See CHIRAKAIKARAN JOSEPH CHACKO, THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DOMINION OF CANADA 76-85 (1932).

108. Tomas Alex Tizon, Firing is Upheld in Retaining Wall Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007,
at A14; Green, supra note 105.
109. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 33, Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp.
2d 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C07-0510).
110. Green, supra note 105.
111. Id.
112. Tizon, supra note 108.
113. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2dat 1201.
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From the outset of the conflict it was not clear who should represent
the IBC. In March 2007 Commissioner Schornack contacted the State
Department's Office of the Legal Advisor for representation but was
told that "the IBC is independent of the State Department and that the
State Department does not have authority to provide the IBC with legal
advice." 1 14
Schornack then contacted the Department of Justice
("DOJ") which agreed to defend the "United States on behalf of the
Commission," but it is after this that accounts of the conflict begin to
diverge. Schornack claimed that the DOJ told him he would need
"international legal advice," and he thus retained Elliot Feldman of
Baker & Hostetler. 115 The DOJ, however, countered that it never
authorized outside counsel, though this is questionable as both the
government procurement office and the DOJ did not challenge the
hiring or payment of Feldman at the time he was retained. 116 In April,
the Leus, represented by the Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF"), became
the first Americans to sue the IBC, filing in Federal District Court in
1 7
Washington.'
What happened between the Leus filing suit and Schornack's
removal is also disputed, though there is no question that the
relationship between Schornack and the DOJ "quickly soured."'1 18 In
June 2007, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ron Tempas threatened
to keep Schornack out of substantive talks regarding the litigation
unless Schornack fired Feldman, stating that only counsel that reported
to the President could represent the IBC. 119 According to Schornack, he
was also warned that he risked "personal exposure" if the IBC refused
to shed its private counsel. 120 Shortly after Feldman filed to appear in
Leu, an assistant to the President, Luis Reyes, contacted Schornack and
questioned his commitment to the President, his patriotism, his devotion
to the Republican Party, and his understanding of a "unitary" form of
government.121 Reyes told Schornack that if he did not fire his private
122
counsel, Reyes would recommend that the President fire Schornack.
Schornack did not comply, and the next day Liza Wright, Assistant to

114. Id.
115. Id.
116.

See id.

117. Id.; Green, supra note 105. Two suits have, however, been filed against the IBC in
Canada. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 n.I.
118. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1201-02.
119. Declaration of Dennis Schornack in Support of Motion to Quash at 4, Leu, 523 F. Supp.
2d 1199 (No. C07-05 10).
120. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
121. Id.
122.

See id.
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the President for Presidential Personnel, notified Schornack of his
123
removal under presidential authority.
Schornack thus became the first person in U.S. history whom the
White House unilaterally fired as head of a bilateral treaty-based
organization. 124
While it is impossible to know the exact
decisionmaking behind the choice to fire Schornack, he has claimed
political influence. Furthermore, Judge Marsha Pechman noted that the
removal "kind of looks like politics, it smells like politics, [and] it talks
like politics."' 125 While some combination of the Bush Administration's
sympathy for private property rights, 12 6 the PLF's conservative
influence and connection with "funding father of the Right," Richard
Scaife, 127 and the Administration's unprecedented commitment to
unitariness in the Executive likely played a role in the removal,1 2 8 any
129
political connection was denied by the DOJ under President Bush.
After receiving the notice of his removal, Schornack responded by
challenging the President's power to remove him. Schornack sent a
letter to Bush objecting to the authority for his removal, and he
continued to pursue his case with the Feldman-led team despite the fact
that the President appointed a new IBC Commissioner, David
Bernhardt, who directed the Feldman-led lawyers to cease work on the
case. 130 On October 12, 2007, Judge Pechman ruled on whether the
President could remove Schornack and whether the DOJ could defend
the IBC.
Judge Pechman found for the Government. Though conceding that
the IBC was a "binational organization that operates independently from
the Canadian and American governments," and acknowledging that
resolving boundary disputes "surely warrants independence from each
123. Schornack was simultaneously removed from his position as U.S. Chairman of the
International Joint Commission. Tom Henry, Ohioan May Join Water Panel, THE BLADE
(Toledo), Dec. 21, 2007. While Schornack's position at the IBC was unpaid, he was receiving
$145,000 in his Joint Commission role. Kart, supra note 10.
124. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
125. Transcript of Record at 41, Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (No. C07-05 10).
126. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless Area
Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations,34 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1147 (2004).
127. See Robert G. Kaiser & Ira Chinoy, Scaife: Funding Father of the Right, WASH. POST,
May 2, 1999, at Al. The PLF was one of the first conservative causes of Richard Scaife, who has
been, perhaps, the most active donor to conservative causes and politicians since the 1970s,
donating tens of millions of dollars to conservative think tanks, legal organizations, and education
groups, including donations that "kept the PLF alive." Robert G. Kaiser & Ira Chinoy, Decades
of Contributionsto Conservatism, WASH. POST, May 2, 1999, at A25.
128. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century:
An Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341,343-44 (2008).
129. Transcript of Record, supra note 125, at 42-43.
130. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04.
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country's political swings," Judge Pechman found that Schornack was
removable by the President. 13 1 In so holding she discussed the
canonical removal power cases, 13 2 and she relied heavily on the 1903
Supreme Court case Shurtleff v. United States. In Shurtleff, an official
that was clearly part of the executive branch, the General Appraiser of
Merchandise, challenged President McKinley's power to remove
him. 13 3 Judge Pechman particularly seemed to emphasize that Shurtleff
"cautioned against assuming Congress intended to create a position with
life tenure unless Congress 'use[d] language that put that intention
beyond doubt."' 13 4
After the ruling, Schomack stated that the
implication of the ruling was that if private parties can agree with the
DOJ on exceptions to the border vista, the authority of the IBC is
diluted. Such an outcome, he reasoned, is contrary to the 1908 and
1925 Treaties, and the border becomes more difficult to protect as
visibility along it decreases. 135 Schornack appealed the ruling, and the
appeal is currently before the Ninth Circuit with the parties disputing
whether the President can remove the U.S. Commissioner and whether
the IBC is a juridical entity with the authority to choose its own
counsel. 136
III. THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY COMMISSION TREATIES AND
REMOVAL POWER LIMITATIONS

Whether the 1908 and 1925 Treaties have the force of domestic law
is relevant to Commissioner Schomack's firing if he argues that the
Treaties collectively prohibit the President from removing him. Before
examining whether the Treaties support this claim, it is necessary to
unpack the constitutional boundaries of the removal power. Even if the
Treaties sought to insulate the U.S. Commissioner from removal, they
could not do so if such insulation was unconstitutional. Section III.A

131. Id. at 1204, 1207.
132. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52 (1926).
133. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 311-12 (1903).
134. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (quoting Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 318). Judge Pechman
further supported her conclusion by noting that the commission signed by President Bush for
Schornack's appointment stated that he served "during the pleasure of the President," as well as
the general reluctance of the federal courts to delve into issues of foreign affairs. Id. at 1208-09.
135. Green, supra note 105.
136. International Boundary Commission and Commissioner Schornack's Response to DOJ's
Reply, Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (No. C07-0510). While any of the substantive issues that the
Ninth Circuit may reach are important, the purpose of this Article is not to forecast the outcome
in Leu, but to step back, examine the IBC, and address the structural issues that the case raises
about the intersection of the treaty and removal powers.
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addresses two predicate issues. First, it is unclear if the IBC is a part of
the U.S. Government or if the U.S. Commissioner is an officer of the
United States. Next, if the Commissioner is an officer, no court has
ever ruled on whether he is an inferior officer. Section III.A also
13 7
addresses the legal character of the IBC, the U.S. Section of the IBC,
and the U.S. Commissioner, concluding that while the IBC may have
international character, the U.S. Section is a part of the U.S.
Government, and the U.S. Commissioner is an officer of the United
States. Section ILI.B addresses the history and breadth of the removal
power, focusing on the constraints that the Supreme Court has allowed
on the power. It claims that, while the Court has not addressed the
ability to limit removal by treaty, under a plain reading of Morrison v.
Olson, 138 a treaty should be able to limit the removal power over
inferior officers. Finally, Section III.C looks to the text, negotiation
history, historical context, and subsequent understanding of the 1908
and 1925 Treaties to demonstrate that, in fact, one of the primary
reasons for creating the IBC was to insulate boundary decisions from
political pressure.
A. What is the Legal Characterof the InternationalBoundary
Commission?
While it may seem odd to engage in a detailed inquiry about the legal
character of the IBC-whether it is even part of the U.S. Governmentanswering such a question proves surprisingly complex as there is no
clear authority. At first glance the IBC appears to be an international
organization with only international legal character; however, a closer
inspection reveals that this may not be the case. Section 1 examines the
applicable treaty language, contemporaneous treaties creating similar
bodies, and subsequent practice in claiming that the U.S. Section is part
of the U.S. Government. Section 2 examines the nature of the office of
the U.S. Commissioner and relies on Supreme Court precedent in
concluding that because of the office's duties, as well as Canada's
treatment of its Commissioner as part of its government, the U.S.
Commissioner is likely an "Officer[] of the United States" for the
purpose of the Appointments Clause and thus the removal power
analysis as well.
137. There is some dispute about whether there is such an entity as the "U.S. Section" of the
IBC, and Commissioner Schomack has claimed that any such designation is a fiction not
supported by the 1908 and 1925 treaties. See Counterclaim at 3, Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (No.
C07-0510). This Article uses "U.S. Section" for convenience simply to refer to the U.S.
Commissioner and her staff and implies no conclusions from the term's use.
138. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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1. Is the International Boundary Commission Part of the U.S.
Government?
The legal character of the IBC is the threshold consideration of a
larger series of questions as to whether the President's removal power
over the IBC Commissioner is limited. However, determining whether
the IBC is an international organization or if it is part of the U.S.
Government is a difficult question. What starts as an inquiry that would
seem to allow a definite answer, quickly becomes a rabbit's hole of
circularity, ambiguity, and question-begging. The distinction matters
for this Article's purposes because the legal character of the IBC, and
specifically the U.S. Section of the IBC, affects whether the removal
analysis from the independent agency cases such as Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, discussed below, 139 is directly precedential,
40
indirectly instructive, or inapplicable.
Despite the seemingly straightforward question as to the IBC's
character, the Leu district court clearly was aware of the difficult inquiry
and stated that it "need not resolve in the context of these motions the
issue of whether the IBC is an agency . ..."141 If the IBC were an
international organization, entirely separate from the U.S. Government,
then it is likely that the 1908 and 1925 Treaties do not create individual
rights that would provide a fired commissioner with a cause of
action, 14 2 and it follows that the removal power jurisprudence does not
strictly apply. Under such a scenario, the removal cases may provide a
framework for thinking about the propriety of the President removing
the Commissioner, but the only party that could protest the removal
would be Canada, and its remedies would exist through international
law and political channels. If, however, the U.S. Section of the IBC is a
part of the U.S. Government, then it is possible that the removal power
jurisprudence is directly applicable. While this Article concedes that
the IBC lies close to the line separating the U.S. Government from

139. See infra Part II.B.
140. The distinction is relevant to the resolution of the Leu's case because they claim that if
the IBC is an international organization that it is not so defined under the International
Organization Immunities Act (IOIA),22 U.S.C. § 288a (2006), which, they argue, would mean
Schomack could not sue on behalf of the IBC because an organization must either be designated
by the IOIA or have capacity to sue be "expressly set forth by the terms of its chartering
document." Appellee-Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 20-22, Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, No.
07-035949 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2008).
141. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. The court also declined to decide whether Schornack was
a "federal officer." Id. It based this ruling on the questionable conclusion that because
Schornack was removed and no longer was employed by the IBC, he was no longer a party to the
litigation and thus the controversy was not live and failed on mootness grounds. Id. at 1212-13.
142. See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) [hereinafter Head Money Cases].
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international organizations, there are a number of indicia that make it
43
more likely that the IBC is not a distinct international organization.1
For organization and employment purposes, the executive branch of
the U.S. Government is divided into departments, each with its own
duties. 14 4 The executive departments and independent establishments
are both considered "executive agencies."' 14 5 The Government Manual,
which describes the organization of the federal government, also lists
"Quasi-Official Agencies" as part of the executive branch. 14 6 Included
in these "Quasi-Official
Agencies"
are "Selected
Bilateral
Organizations," for which the Government Manual lists the IBC, along
with the International Joint Commission ("IJC") and the International
147
Boundary and Water Commission ("IBWC"), among others.

Thus, on its face, the IBC appears as though it may be an
organization with international legal character, separate from the U.S.
Government. One could simply look to the Government Manual and
point out that the IBC is a bilateral treaty organization.1 4 8 While some
commentators have failed to question the status of the 1IBC and instead
referred to it-casually and often in passing-as a bilateral treaty
organization or an international organization, 149 other writers have
noted the difficulty of categorizing the IBC but failed to address the
substantive question. 150 The fallacy of such quick-look analyses-as
143. While the only remedy for the removal may lie with Canada if the IBC were, in fact, an
international organization, it remains doubtful that the President would have the authority to
remove the U.S. Commissioner under this understanding of the IBC.
144. These departments are the cabinet-headed agencies, 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); military
departments, which are the Army, Navy, and Air Force, id. § 102; government corporations, such
as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, id. § 103; see 7
U.S.C. § 1501 (2006); 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2006); and "independent establishments," which include
the Federal Communications Commission, Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the Office
of Special Counsel, among many others, 5 U.S.C. § 104 (2006); see GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE,
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2008-2009, at 363-568 (2008) [hereinafter
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2008-2009].
145. 5 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
146. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2008-2009, supra note 144, at 559-90.
147. Id. at 589-90.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Land Feuds and Their Solutions: Finding InternationalLaw
Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 808, 826 (2006).
150. See, e.g., John Kerr Rose, GeographicalRecord, North American: The Canada-Alaska
Boundary, 44 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 289, 290 (1954) ("Though the Commission reports yearly to
the Department of State, it is otherwise listed as an independent agency."). One careful and
thorough study of the number of intergovernmental organizations listed the IBC as an
intergovernmental organization, Michael Wallace & J. David Singer, Intergovernmental
Organizations in the Global System, 1815-1964: A Quantitative Description, 2 INT'L ORG. 239,
252 (1970); however, such a designation need not mean that the IBC is outside of control of the
executive branch. At least one commentator, in trying to make sense of the executive branch
following the New Deal, categorized both the IBC and the UC as part of the State Department.
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well as the difficulty of classifying the IBC-can be quickly
demonstrated by comparing the IJC, an organization founded by treaty
that deals with water issues in the Great Lakes, to the IBWC, also
created by treaties, which deals with water and boundary issues along
the U.S.-Mexican border.
The IJC and IBWC, their histories, and their founding documents are
discussed in greater detail below, but, for now, it is sufficient to
consider that despite the fact that both organizations seem similar to
each other and to the 1BC, and despite the fact that the Government
Manual, as well as various appropriations acts, treat the agencies as
possessing equivalent legal character, 15 1 the IJC is an independent
international organization for which the Appointments Clause, the
question of an "Officer[] of the United States," and, to some degree the
removal analysis, simply does not apply. A treaty governs those
procedures of the IJC. 15 2 The IBWC is different in that as a
Commission it is has the "status of an international body,"' 153 but the
U.S. Commissioner and the U.S. Section are treated as a part of the U.S.
Government, with all of the statutory and constitutional consequences
that such classification entails. 15 4 Thus, a more in-depth discussion is
L.F. Schmeckebier, Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the
United States: A Tabular View Showing Changes Made Between March 4 and November 1, 1933,
27 AM. POL. SC. R. 942, 948 (1933) (noting the location in the executive branch of every agency
that the author deemed federal). However, the Federal Court of Claims and the Eighth Circuit
have rejected the claim that the IJC is part of the Government. See Erosion Victims of Lake
Superior Regulation v. United States, 833 F.2d 297, 299-301 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Tex. State
Bank v. United States, 423 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The two other courts to directly
address the legal status of the UC have determined that the UC is a separate international body
that is not part of the U.S. Government. Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 865 n.23 (6th Cir.
1978); Soucheray v. Corps of Engineers of U.S. Army, 483 F. Supp. 352, 354-55 (W.D. Wis.
1979). The Sixth Circuit has agreed that "the IJC and its subsidiary boards are international
bodies, not agents of the United States, even though the members of the commission and its
boards include United States citizens and employees of the Corps of Engineers." Miller, 583 F.2d
at 865 n.23. The Western District of Wisconsin court agreed. Soucheray, 483 F. Supp. at 355
n.3.
151. See, e.g., THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2008-2009, supra note 144, at
589; SUSAN B. EPSTEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: STATE
DEPARTMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES FY 2001 APPROPRIATIONS 5 (2001).
152. See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain relating to the Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. Vfl, XII, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448
[hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
153. See Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, Feb. 3,
1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter IBWC 1944 Treaty].
154. See, e.g., Stephen P. Mumme, Reinventing the International Boundary and Water
Commission, 9 BORDERLINES 1, No. 6, (2001); International Boundary and Water Commission,
U.S. International Boundary & Water Commission, http://www.ibwc.state.gov/home.html (last
visited Dec. 29, 2008) (explaining that the U.S. Section of the IBWC is "a federal government
agency and the U.S. component of the International Boundary and Water Commission"); see also
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required to determine whether the IBC is more like the IJC or the

IBWC.
Any discussion of the legal character of the IBC should begin with
the text of the 1908 and 1925 Treaties that created it, and these Treaties
indicate that there is a plausible textual reason to think that the IBC is a
part of both the U.S. and Canadian governments. The Treaties do not
actually set up any commission named the "International Boundary
Commission." 15 5 In fact, neither the phrase "International Boundary

Commission," nor even "boundary commission," is present in either
treaty. 156
Nor do the Treaties speak of the formation of a
"Commission"; instead, they speak of the appointment of
"Commissioners." 157 Tellingly, where under other similar treaties there
is language regarding the formation of a "tribunal" or "a
Commission,"' 15 8 the 1908 Treaty reads: "The High Contracting Parties
agree that each shall appoint, without delay, an expert geographer or
surveyor to serve as Commissioners for the purpose of more accurately
defining and marking the international boundary line between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada .... ,159 Likewise, the 1925
Treaty, describing the work of the IBC, failed to mention the
"Commission," but instead stated:

Allis-Chalmers Corp., Hydro-Turbine Div. v. Friedkin, 635 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980) (treating the
IBWC as an agency of the U.S. Government); Mestan v. Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, U.S.
& Mex., No. 04-3095, 2004 WL 843111 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2004) (allowing employment suit
against IBWC and treating it as the "agency," though finding against plaintiff on other grounds);
Steven G. Ingram, In a Twenty-First Century "Minute", 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 164 (2004);
Bridget Kellogg, The Dam Controversy: Does the EndangeredSpecies Act Apply Internationally
to Protect Foreign Species Harmed by Dams on the Colorado River?, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 447, 463-64 (2004).
155. See 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, passim; 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, passim.
156. See 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, passim; 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, passim.
157. The 1908 Treaty references the "Commissioners" more than seventy times, and the only
instances in which it references a "Commission" is in referring to the already-existing
"International Waterways Commission," now the IJC, which was concurrently created by treaty
between the United States and Great Britain, Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 152, art. VIII.,
as well as two separate "Joint Commissions" for demarcating the boundary along the Rocky
Mountains, which were created by "joint action" between the parties in 1872 and 1858. See 1908
Treaty, supra note 74, arts. IV, VI-VH. In one instance, the 1908 Treaty does seem to refer to the
IBC as a "Commission." Id. art. IX. This statement is, however, much less explicit than the
commissions created by both the Boundary Waters Treaty and the agreement creating the IBWC.
See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
158. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 152, art. IlI (stating that the treaty was creating
a "joint commission, to be known as the International Joint Commission" for the resolution of
disputes and management of border issues); Alaska Boundary Treaty, supra note 72, art. I
(requiring that "[a] tribunal shall be immediately appointed" to answer remaining Alaska
boundary questions).
159. 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. I.
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[The boundary should be located by] the Commissioners appointed
under the said Treaty of April 11, 1908, and shall be marked by them
on the chart ... and a detailed account of the work done by the Commissioners in locating said point ... shall be included in the report or
0

16
reports prepared pursuant to the said Articles.
It is possible that the distinction between naming an actual
"Commission" and referring to "Commissioners" is insignificant, but
other textual evidence within the Treaties suggests otherwise. For
example, the portion of the 1908 Treaty that does speak of a
"Commission" is not where the Treaty is describing what was to
become the IBC-there the Treaty speaks of "Commissioners"-but
when it describes two other "Joint Commission[s]," which were created
in 1872 and 1856 to originally create maps. 16 1 Since the 1908 Treaty
does not refer to the boundary Commissioners it authorizes as being part
of a "joint commission," if there is to be a difference between a
"Commissioner" and a "joint commission," references to the 1872 and
1856 agreements might explicitly authorize a "commission"; in fact,
they do.
The 1872 agreement, as enacted by Congress, authorizes the
"appointment of a joint commission ... for determining the boundary

line," 162 and the 1856 congressional enactment, implementing the 1846
Treaty, speaks of "the proceedings of the said commission." 163 By the
time the work of this later, less explicitly chartered "commission" was
completed in 1870, the United States and Great Britain described it as
the "Joint Commission of the Northwest Boundary" in a declaration
164
signed by both States approving the Commission's mapping work.
This understanding of the U.S. and British governments in 1870 likely
informed the conceptualization of the "commission" in the 1846 Treaty
as a "Joint Commission" by the time the parties drafted the 1908
Treaty. 16 5 Such a distinction is further supported by the fact that Article
160. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. I.
161. 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, arts. VI-VIl (mapping of the Boundary from the
northwestern-most point of the Lake of the Woods to the summit of the Rocky Mountains).
162. Act of Mar. 19, 1872, ch. 62, 17 Stat. 43.
163. Act of Aug. 11, 1856, ch. 87, 11 Stat. 42.
164. Declaration Adopting Maps of Boundary, Feb. 24, 1870, 1 Malloy 658.
165. This is likely true because the 1908 Treaty refers to this Joint Commission as follows:
[A] Joint Commission organized in 1858 for that purpose and composed of two
Commissioners appointed one by each Government, which charts, duly certified and
authenticated in duplicate by said Commissioners, were approved and adopted by the
two Governments, as appears from the declaration in writing to that effect signed on
February 24, 1870.
1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. VII. While this 1870 date is the exact date that U.S. Secretary of
State and Sir E. Thorton, British Minister at Washington, signed the Declaration approving of the
Joint Commission's work, see Declaration Adopting Maps of Boundary, supra note 164, the
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VIII of the 1908 Treaty departs from the "Joint Commission" language
used in describing the 1872 and 1856 ad hoc boundary commissions and
does not provide any proper noun for the "Commissioners" who, under
the 1873 Northwest Water Boundary Protocol, were described simply as
"commissioners" and who were not described as part of any specific
commission. 16 6 The "Commissioners" language is also used in a 1910
Treaty implementing the 1908 Treaty in Passamaquoddy Bay. 167 In
addition, the first draft of the 1908 Treaty required that one
Commissioner from each State-party be appointed for the boundary
task; however, the British objected and the final Treaty allowed
different Commissioners to be appointed for different sections of the
boundary, allowing a result that could have looked much less like an
organized commission. 168 Finally, the 1925 Treaty seems to use this
distinction, referring to the actions taken under the 1908 Treaty only as
of the
those taken by "the Commissioners," but referring to the actions
' 169
body under the 1872 Treaty as taken by a "Joint Commission."
Such a textual distinction is more compelling when the language is
compared to that used in the treaties that created other bodies that are
similar to the IBC. The language of the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, 170 which created the IJC, is thus relevant to the IBC questions.
In giving authority to the IJC to define the boundary in the Great Lakes
region, the Boundary Waters Treaty refers to itself as a "concurrent
action of the United States and the Dominion of Canada" with the 1908
Treaty. 17 1 This is key because the IJC is not deemed to be a federal
17 2
agency but is instead "an independent international organization."'
reference to 1858 is slightly imprecise because the treaty was signed in 1846, and Congress
approved the "commission," including funding, in 1856. Act of Aug. 11, 1856, ch. 87, 11 Stat.
42. However, it was not until 1858 that the Commissioners actually commenced operations
because of delays in appointing the British Commissioner. See CHANDLER P. ANDERSON, U.S.

69 (1906).
166. See Northwest Water Boundary Protocol, Mar. 10, 1873, 18 Stat. 369 (departing from
previous treaty language by referring to commission as merely "commissioners").
167. Treaty between His Majesty and the United States of America respecting the Boundary
between Canada and the United States in Passamaquoddy Bay, U.S.-Gr. Brit., May 21, 1910, 36
Stat. 2477.
168. See Letter from Chandler P. Anderson to Sec. of State Elihu Root (Mar. 21, 1908) (on
file with author). In addition, the draft Treaty that the United States proposed would have
allowed the governments, together, to consolidate any of these "Commissions" with overlapping
Commissioners into a single "Commission." See Letter from Sec. of State Elihu Root to
Ambassador of Great Britain James Bryce (Jan. 9, 1908) (on file with author).
169. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, passim.
170. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 152.
171. 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. IV.
172. See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 912
F.2d 1525, 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Erosion Victims of Lake Superior Regulation v. United States,
833 F.2d 297, 299 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Thomas v. State of New York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1445 (D.C.
DEPT. OF STATE, NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE UNITED STATES
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However, unlike the 1908 Treaty, the Boundary Waters Treaty
explicitly creates not only "Commissioners" but a "Joint Commission":
It is agreed that ...no further or other uses or obstructions or diversions .. shall be made except by authority of the United States or the
Dominion of Canada within their respective jurisdictions and with the
approval, as hereinafter provided, of a joint commission, to be known
as the International Joint Commission. 173
Such language explicitly creating an "International Joint
Commission," distinct from the "Commissioner" language in the 1908
74
BC Treaty, continues throughout the Boundary Waters agreement.1
The treaties creating the IBWC further provide contrast to the 1908
and 1925 Treaties. In describing itself today, the IBWC states that it "is
an international body composed of the United States Section and the
Mexican Section, each headed by an Engineer-Commissioner appointed
by his/her respective president." 17 5 It continues, "Each Section is
administered independently of the other. The United States Section of
the International Boundary and Water Commission is a federal
government agency created in 1924 that is headquartered in El Paso,
Texas. The IBWC operates under the foreign policy guidance of the
Department of State."' 17 6 As a U.S. agency, 177 the Secretary of State has
delegated the authority to "administer water rights between the United
States and Mexico" to the Commissioner of the U.S. Section. 178 The
language in the convention that created what is now the IBWC-then
known as the International Boundary Commission-is also noticeably
different from the language creating the IBC. Whereas the 1908 and
1925 Treaties refer to the "Commissioners" and do not discuss the
formation of an independent "Commission," 179 the 1889 convention
between the United States and Mexico is explicit in its creation of a
"Commission." 180 This explicit "International Boundary Commission"
Cir. 1986); Edison Sault Elec. Co. v. United States, 552 F.2d 326, 336 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
173. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 152, art. III.
174. E.g., id. art. VII; see also id. arts. IV, VI, VIII-XII (utilizing the term "International Joint
Commission" or "Commission").
175. International
Boundary
and Water Commission,
About the
U.S.
IBC,
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/About-Us/AboutUs.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2009).
176. Id.; see 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2006).
177. See, e.g., Villarreal v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 879, 879-80 (S.D. Tex. 1959)
("Plaintiff ...
alleges in general terms negligence of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, an agency of the United States .... ").
178. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. I v. Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n,
U.S. Section, 701 F. Supp. 121, 122 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
179. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, passim; 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, passim.
180. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of Mexico to
Facilitate the Carrying Out of the Principles Contained in the Treaty of November 12, 1884, and
to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Reason of the Changes Which Take Place in the Bed of
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language was used again in the 1945 Treaty that created the modem
years the 1908 and 1925 Treaties
IBWC, despite that in the intervening
' 18 1
"Commissioners."
created only

Moving beyond text, other indicia of the U.S. Government's
conception of the IBC's legal character further support the fact that the
U.S. Section of the IBC is part of the U.S. Government. For payroll

purposes, for example, the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM")
has considered field crew employees, including the "instrumentmen,

foremen, recorders, packers, cooks, and axemen," of the U.S. Section of
the IBC as Schedule A employees in the Excepted Service and part of
the State Department. 182 In proposing construction of a U.S.-Canadian
bridge, the State Department cited "the U.S. Office of the International
Boundary Commission" as one of the "cooperating agencies" of the
18 3
"U.S. Government."
A further indicium of whether a body is an international organization
or part of the U.S. Government is the list of international organizations
in which the United States participates under the International
Organization Immunities Act ("IOIA").184 The IOIA "'provides the
legal framework within which international organizations operate in the
United States."' 185 In an impressive feat of circularity, the Act provides
the following definition of international organizations:

the Rio Grande and that of the Colorado River, U.S.-Mex., art. I, Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512
[hereinafter IBWC Treaty]. The treaty states, "All differences or questions that may arise ...
shall be submitted for examination and decision to an International Boundary Commission, which
shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the case of said differences or questions." Id. This language
built upon earlier U.S.-Mexican boundary agreements, which had explicitly and repeatedly
referred to "a joint commission." See, e.g., Convention between the United States of America
and the United States of Mexico, Nov. 27, 1872, 18 Stat. 760.
181. See IBWC 1944 Treaty, supra note 153, art. I.
182. See, e.g., Excepted Service Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 28251 (June 4, 1996); Excepted Service
Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 45217 (Aug. 30, 1995); Excepted Service Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 50575 (Sept.
28, 1993); Excepted Service Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 43431 (Sept. 23, 1983). But see Exec. Order
No. 8043, 4 Fed. Reg. 493, 494 (Jan. 31, 1939) (listing State Department positions in Schedule A
of the excepted service as, inter alia, "All employees of international commissions, congresses,
conferences, and boards, except the International Joint Commission; the International Boundary
Commission, United States and Mexico; and the International Boundary Commission, United
States, Alaska, and Canada"); Exec. Order No. 9830, 12 Fed. Reg. 1259 (Feb. 25, 1947)
(providing a seeming transition between the pre-World War II rules which excluded IBC
employees from the excepted service and the more recent rules which have included temporary
IBC employees in the excepted service).
183. Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant
Impact for International Bridge at Calais, ME, 70 Fed. Reg. 22383 (Apr. 29, 2005). But see infra
notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
184. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).
185. Appellee-Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 140, at 21 (quoting In re Hashim, 188
B.R.633, 645 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995)).
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For the purposes of this subchapter, the term "international organization" means a public international organization in which the United
States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any
Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation, and which shall have been designated
by the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled
to enjoy the 86
privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in this
subchapter. 1
The list of eligible organizations that the President has so designated
187
is "quite extensive" and includes more than eighty organizations.
Interestingly, the list includes the IBWC,' 8 8 the IJC,'8 9 and the Great
Lakes Fisheries Commission ("GLFC"), 190 as well as the Border
Environment Cooperation Commission191 and the United States-Mexico
Border Health Commission, 192 but it does not include the IBC. 193 The
most likely explanation for the IBC being left off of this extensive list is
that the Government has not traditionally viewed the IBC as an
19
international organization. 4
186. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).
187. David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United States Law of Citizenship by
Descent, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 325 n.33 (2005); see 22 U.S.C. § 288.
188. Exec. Order No. 12,467, 49 Fed. Reg. 8229 (Mar. 2, 1984).
189. Exec. Order No. 9972, 13 Fed. Reg. 3573 (June 25, 1948).
190. Exec. Order No. 11059, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,405 (Oct. 23, 1962). The GLFC is a binational
international organization with both a U.S. and a Canadian Section that, like the IJC and IBWC,
is structured like the IBC. While the legal character of the GLFC is an international organization,
see W.J. Christie, The Ecosystem Approach to Managing the Great Lakes: The New Ideas and
Problems Associated with Implementing Them, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 279, 287-91 (1995); Daniel
K. DeWitt, Great Words Needed for the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909, 69 IND. L.J. 299, 316 (1993), the U.S. Commissioners "are appointed by the
President for six-year terms. Commissioners of Canada are appointed by the Privy Council and
serve at the Council's pleasure." Great Lakes Fishery Commission, GLFC About Us - GLFC In
Brief, http://www.glfc.org/aboutus/brief.php#mission (last visited Aug. 15, 2009). Again, unlike
the IBC treaties, Article II of the treaty creating the GLFC spoke of a "Commission": "The
Contracting Parties agree to establish and maintain a joint commission, to be known as the Great
Lakes Fishery Commission, hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission', and to be composed of
two national sections, a Canadian Section and a United States Section." Convention on Great
Lakes Fisheries, U.S.-Can., art. II, $ 1, Sept. 10, 1954, 63 U.S.T. 2836 [hereinafter Fisheries
Convention].
191. Exec. Order No. 12,904, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,179 (Mar. 16, 1994).
192. Exec. Order No. 13,367, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,605 (Dec. 21, 2004).
193. See 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).
194. Such a claim addresses the first condition of the IOIA, whether the IBC is "a public
international organization in which the United States participates." Id. Another possibility for
the IBC's exclusion, and the exclusion of eligible organizations in general, is under the second
prong of Section 288. Such an argument contends that "it was not contemplated that all
organizations in which the United States participate[s] would have the privileges enumerated in
the [IOIA]." Note, The Status of InternationalOrganizationsUnder the Law of the United States,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1307 (1958). One making this claim could argue that "[flailure to
designate an eligible organization might be interpreted as an executive determination that it
should not be accorded any of the privileges specified in the act." Id. Such a claim, however,
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This is not to say that there are no suggestions that the 1BC is
separate from the U.S. Government; such evidence is simply less
compelling. Unlike OPM, which treated the IBC employees as federal
employees for use of government vehicles and resources, 195 the General
Services Administration has treated the IBC not like independent
agencies such as the FCC and SEC, but as part of a group of
"international organizations" like NATO, the American Red Cross, the
IJC, and the International Boundary and Water Commission. 196 The
State Department has also included the IBC on a list of "International
Organizations and Activities" to which the State Department has
employees "assigned197on reimbursable detail and/or for accounting or
'
recording purposes."
The most compelling pieces of evidence for the argument that the

IBC is not part of the U.S. Government are a number of brief memos
and letters in which the State Department determined that the IBC was
not an "agency" for purposes of the Sunshine Act, the Competitive Civil
Service, or the National Environmental Policy Act. 198 However, the
requires assuming that, under the IOIA's first prong, an organization is an eligible "international
Particularly given the IBC's
organization" for presidential inclusion in the first place.
involvement in Pettibone,see infra notes 414-18 and accompanying text, and the extensive IOIA
list-it includes more than eighty organizations including less prominent organizations than the
IBC, such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization and the Commission for
the Study of Alternatives to the Panama Canal, among others, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006)-it is
unlikely that the IBC has been left off the list due to an oversight.
195. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Eligibility to Use GSA Sources of Supply and Services, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,503,
41,504-05 (Sept. 10, 1992).
197. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, VOLUME 4, HANDBOOK 1,
ACCOUNT STRUCTURE AND CLASSIFICATION CODES, 4 FAH-1 H-450, INTERNATIONAL
2
(2008),
ACTIVITIES
AND
ORGANIZATIONS
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89450.pdf. Even the way the website for the IBC
is hosted, perhaps too modern an indicia to be of real value, demonstrates that the IBC is different
from other similar bodies. Whereas the U.S. Section of the IBWC is part of the State
Department's website and has a ".gov" address, see U.S. International Boundary & Water
Commission, http://www.ibwc.state.gov/home.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009), and the website
for the Mexican Section of the IBWC is hosted as part of the Mexican Government and has a
".mx" address, see Comisi6n Internacional de Limites y Aguas Entre M6xico y Los Estados
Unidos Secci6n Mexicana, http://www.sre.gob.mx/cila (last visited Aug. 15, 2009), the IBC is
hosted jointly, and like most other international organizations it uses the ".org" domain, see
International Boundary Commission, http://www.internationalboundarycomnission.org /indexeng.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009). Likewise, the International Joint Commission is also
hosted jointly at a ".org" domain. See International Joint Commission, http://www.ijc.org (last
visited Aug. 15, 2009). Commissioner Schornack has asserted that the IBC website is different
because the State Department, "recognizing the autonomy of the Commission, would not allow it
to have a '.gov' suffix." Declaration of Dennis Schornack at 8, Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n,
523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C07-0510).
198. See Reply on Motion to Quash All Department of Justice Filings In This Matter,
Including Its Notice of Appearance at 2, Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (No. C07-0510) (collecting
State Department memos and letters).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

fact that the IBC was not deemed an "agency" for specific statutory
purposes is certainly not dispositive as to whether it is a component of
the U.S. Government. Further, the documents were decades old, not
rigorously reasoned or formalized in any policy or statute, and admitted
99
to potential confusion and difficulty in their analyses. 1
Most likely, these contrasting authorities demonstrate that there is
simply confusion over the legal character of the IBC. The Plum Book,
for example, is a listing of "presidentially appointed positions within the
Federal Government" published by either the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs or the House Committee
on Government Reform alternately every four years after a presidential
election. 20 0
Even the Plum Book, one of the most exhaustive
accountings of federal employment, 20 1 has shown confusion in how to
define the IBC. The 2008 Plum Book categorizes the IBC as a division
of the State Department, 20 2 yet the 2000 and 2004 Plum Books listed the
203
IBC as an independent agency analogous to, for example, the FCC.
Finally, U.S. assessments that the IBC is part of the U.S. Government
agree with the IBC's conception of its own legal character. As
explained in a paper presented by the Canadian Commissioner to the
IBC, the Commission, though a "bilateral treaty organization," is
structurally a part of both the U.S. and Canadian governments. 20 4 As he
explained, "[t]he Canadian Commissioner," who is "a full-time
199. Id. Ex. A (memo and letter concluding that the IBC is not an "agency" and is outside the
scope of the Sunshine Act); id. Ex. B (1977 memos outlining the status of IBC and IJC

Personnel).
200. GPO Access, Plum Book: About, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/about.html (last
visited Aug. 15, 2009).
201. The Plum Book lists the thousands of federal civil service positions in the legislative and
executive branches that may be subject to noncompetitive appointment. Id.
202. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (THE PLUM BOOK) 113 (2008),
availableat http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/2008/index.html.
203. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (THE PLUM BOOK) vii, 174 (2004), available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/2004/index.htmI; COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
U.S. SENATE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (THE PLUM
BOOK) 258 (2000), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/2000/index.html. The 2004
Plum Book, however, may contain an error in that it lists "Jack David" as the "United States
Chairman" of the IBC, yet it seems as though Jack David never served in this capacity (and that
Commissioner Schomack held that position in 2004) and, instead, held the title noted in the Plum

Book with the United States Section of the United States and Canada Permanent Joint Board on
Defense.
See,
e.g.,
The
White
House,
Nominations
and
Appointments,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020301-8.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2008);

The
Hudson
Institute,
About
Hudson,
Jack
David,
http://www.hudson.org/learn/index.cfm?fuseaction=staffbio&eid=JackDavid (last visited Aug.
28, 2009).
204. McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 3.
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permanent employee of the federal public service," formally "reports
directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs." 20 5 In addition, "the
Canadian section of the Commission is an administrative part of the
Department of Natural Resources .... 206 Further, "[t]he United States
section of the Commission reports to, and is administered by, the
Department of State." 20 7 The report-one of the most detailed
treatments of the IBC-explains that the U.S. and Canadian Sections
each have a separate operational structure as well: "A field party of one
section of the Commission works alone on both sides of the border in an
area to which it is assigned, without any requirement for participation,
supervision or scrutiny by the other section." 20 8 In addition, the IBC's
website asserts that the U.S. Commissioner "reports to the Secretary of
State," 20 9 a statement with which commentators have agreed and upon
which they have relied.2 10
Thus, despite this competing-or confusing-authority, the evidence
that the U.S. Section should be considered a part of the U.S.
Government, particularly given the Treaty text,2 1 1 is more compelling
than any other position, even if the issue has not been settled in court.
2. Is the International Boundary Commission Commissioner an Officer
of the United States?
Determining the constitutional employment status of the U.S.
Commissioner to the IBC must begin with the Constitution itself and the
Supreme Court statements addressing who are "Officers of the United
States."
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution vests the
following power in the President:
[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. International Boundary Commission, IBC-International Boundary Commission,
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/about.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).
210. See, e.g., Daniel Gilman, Oy Canada! Trade's Non-Solution to "the Problem" of U.S.
Drug Prices, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 247, 253 n.32 (2006) (noting as well the distribution of
regulatory authority concerning the border).
211. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
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the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart2 12
ments.
The leading Supreme Court case describing who are "Officers of the
United States" is Buckley v. Valeo.2 13 The Court in Buckley, examining
the office of Commissioner to the Federal Election Commission
("FEC"), reiterated that all "Officers" must be appointed in accordance
with the Appointments Clause and explained that all persons
"exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States" are officers of the United States. 2 14 While the Court has
emphasized that the strictures of the Appointments Clause are "among
2 15
the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme,"
and while it has elaborated that officers of the United States enjoy more
than a merely "temporary" or "episodic" opportunity to act pursuant to
or enforce federal law, 2 16 the Court has not provided significant
additional substance to flesh out the Buckley test.
Recognizing the lack of detail that the Supreme Court has provided
as to who is an "Officer[] of the United States," the Office of Legal
Counsel ("OLC") has addressed the issue in an attempt to provide
guidance to the President. Its forty-one page memo devoted to the
question, titled Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, provides a useful framework for analyzing the
officer question, and this Section relies on the framework set up in that
memo. 2 17 The basic conclusion of the OLC memo is as follows:
A position to which is delegated by legal authority a portion of the
sovereign powers of the federal Government and that is "continuing"
is a federal office subject to the Constitution's Appointments Clause.
A person who would hold such a position must be properly made an
"Officer[] of the United States" by being appointed
pursuant to the
2 18
procedures specified in the Appointments Clause.
The memo thus concluded that a position, "however labeled," is a
federal office for which an officeholder "must be properly made an
'Officer[] of the United States' by being appointed pursuant to the
212. U.S. CONST. art. HI,§ 2, cl. 2.
213. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
214. Id. at 126.
215. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651,659, 663 (1997).
216. See Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (distinguishing
special trial judges from special masters who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary basis
and whose duties are not statutorily delineated).
217. Memorandum Opinion from the Dept. of Justice Office of Legal Counsel for the General
Counsels of the Executive Branch, Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause (Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter OLC, Officers of the United States], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausev10.pdf.
218. Id. at 1.
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procedures specified in the Appointments Clause" on two conditions:

First, if the office is "invested by legal authority with a portion of the
sovereign powers of the federal Government," and, second, if the office
2 19
is "continuing," then Appointments Clause limitations are operative.
While this is not an explicit test that the Supreme Court has endorsed,
the analysis is drawn almost entirely from the Constitution and Supreme
Court jurisprudence interpreting the phrase "Officers of the United
States." 220 While any position of the OLC is necessarily "ever zealous
of presidential prerogative, "221 it is a fair application of those cases, and
as such it provides a way to parse the inquiry into whether the IBC
222
Commissioner is an "Officer[] of the United States."

The first of two necessary questions for finding someone an
"Officer[] of the United States" is thus whether the office at issue
"involves a position to which is delegated by legal authority a portion of
the sovereign powers of the federal Government;" 22 3 or put in the
parlance of Buckley, whether an officer exercises "significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States." 2 24 The grounds for requiring
the delegation of sovereign powers of the federal Government derive
from the Constitution's command that the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed, 22 5 along with the Supreme
Court's early recognition that the President's power to appoint officers
is "the means of fulfilling" that obligation. 22 6 As Chief Justice Marshall
described, "An office is defined to be 'a public charge or employment,'

219. Id.
220. See id. at 1-3, 5, 8, 12 (citing, among many others, Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659, 663;
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 877, 881; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976); Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 133 (1926)).
221. Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and SupranationalJudicial Review, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 833, 863 (2007).
222. The OLC and the AG have a strong record of interpreting the Appointments Clause. The
Court's holding in Buckley-that the Appointments Clause provides the exclusive method of
appointment for anyone considered an "Officer of the United States"-"was anticipated by a line
of Attorney General opinions dating back to well before the Civil War." OLC, Officers of the
United States, supra note 217, at 2 (citing, as examples, Appointment and Removal of Inspectors
of Customs, 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 162, 164 (1843); Civil Service Comm'n, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 516,
518 (1871)).
223. OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 4.
224. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
225. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
226. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890). This conclusion is further supported by early
debate on the Ratification and Madison's argument that the Government is "administered by
persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior," THE
FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison); as well as the common law at the time of the Founding,
which described "an officer" as "simply one whom the King had charged with a duty... ."
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 85 (5th rev. ed.
1984).
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and he who performs the duties of the office, is an officer." 22 7 Early
commentators and cases focused on the fact that an "officer" had to
receive some delegation of sovereign power and be able to bind the
sovereign or the people with his decision, not merely make
This understanding, only slightly varied,
recommendations. 22 8
eventually became the command in Buckley that to be an "Officer" one
had to exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
'229
States."
The first component of the "delegated power" 2 30 or "significant
authority" 23 1 inquiry is easily met for the U.S. Commissioner. Despite
a question about the meaning of "laws of the United States," discussed
below,2 3 2 the U.S. Commissioner has significant authority to "bind third
parties, or the Government itself, for the public benefit." 23 3 The
Commissioner does this under the authority of the 1908 and 1925
Treaties. 2 34 The IBC's determinations can have dispositive legal effect
in litigation even beyond creating a cause of action. 2 35 Like the FEC in
Buckley, 2 36 the IBC has regulatory authority that allows it to define the
boundary. 237 Further, the OLC has argued that "positions with
authority" to "conduct . . .foreign negotiations" have the significant
authority that the Court has required,2 38 and the U.S. Commissioner
clearly possesses this authority. These negotiations entail the precise
definition of U.S. territory, and the power to define territory is a key
component and powerful facet of a State's sovereignty. 2 39 Finally, the
Court has held that discretion is at least relevant to whether one is
considered an "Officer." 240 While the IBC Commissioners may not
227. United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747).
228. See OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 8-11 (citing, inter alia,
Opinion of the Justices, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 481, 482 (1822)); ASHER C. HINDS, I HINDS'
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 604 (1907) (stating that "a commission
created by law to investigate and report, but having no legislative, judicial, or executive powers"
was not an "office"); FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND

OFFICERS § 1 (1890).
229. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
230. See OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 12.
231. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
232. See infra notes 261-83 and accompanying text.
233. OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 12.
234. See supra notes 42-45, 94, 104, 160 and accompanying text; infra notes 397-401 and

accompanying text.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., 120 F.2d 850, 854-55 (8th Cir. 1941).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41.
See supra text and accompanying notes 35-42.
See OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 15 (internal citation omitted).

239. See SEYOM BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL SYSTEM:
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE WORLD POLITY 60-70 (1992).

240. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138.
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have wide discretion on a number of issues, within the sphere created by
the 1908 and 1925 Treaties they exercise discretion as to measuring and
Therefore, it seems that the U.S.
defining the boundary. 24 1
Commissioner is an officer of the United States under this first test, as
he enjoys considerable discretion, often over a term of many years, and
makes decisions of significant import to which federal courts have
242
given dispositive weight.
OLC's second necessary question to determine if someone is an
officer is whether an office is "continuing. "243 This idea of continuing
authority stems from a number of Supreme Court decisions, including
Chief Justice Marshall's explanation in United States v. Maurice, that
"[a]lthough an office is 'an employment,' it does not follow that every
employment is an office. A man may certainly be employed under a
contract . . .to do an act, or perform a service, without becoming an
officer." 244 The Supreme Court supported this distinction in United
States v. Germaine in holding that a surgeon appointed by the
Commissioner of Pensions for the purpose of examining pension
applicants was not an officer because he was "only to act when called
on by the Commissioner of Pensions in some special case." 245 Such
reasoning is further buttressed by the fact that presidents dating back to
Washington have tapped members of Congress to serve on commissions
and international delegations without creating problems with the
Incompatibility Clause, which would have required those members to
give up their seats in Congress if they took an "Office under the United
States." 24 6 This understanding of a temporal aspect to one being an
"Officer" is also reflected in early opinions of the Attorney General
("AG") and Reconstruction-era Supreme Court cases, 24 7 as well as later

241. See 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, arts. II-VIII; 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. IV.
242. Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., 120 F.2d 850, 854-55 (8th Cir. 1941) (emphasizing
that once the Commission has formally demarcated the international boundary, it is "fixed as a
matter of law" thereby affecting territorial claims).
243. See OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 23-45. A discussion of
whether OLC's analysis is beyond Buckley's requirements is unnecessary here since the
See infra notes 249-55 and
Commissioner has delegated authority that is continuing.
accompanying text.
244. United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747). Note
that Marshall decided this case while sitting as a circuit judge. Id.
245. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878).
246. OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 24-25. For an interesting take on
the President and the Incompatibility Clause, see Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President
May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution's Incompatibility Clause, 4
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 107 (2009).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867) (emphasizing the
importance of duration and tenure in "Officer" status); Authority of Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant of Marine Corps, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 77, 78-79 (1828). Hartwell also focused on
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Court statements on the Appointments8 Clause and duration of office in
24
Germaine and Auffinordt v. Hedden.
The temporal aspect of the Buckley analysis is easily met by the 1925
Treaty. OLC views the history at the founding and Supreme Court
precedent as follows: "An office exists where a position that possesses
delegated sovereign authority is permanent, meaning that it is not
limited by time or by being of such a nature that it will terminate 'by the
very fact of performance.' 249 Under the temporal analysis above, the
Commissioners under the 1908 Treaty were not "Officers" in the
strictest sense because their appointment was essentially as ad hoc
commissioners for whom the 1908 Treaty contemplated that their work
could be "completed., 25 0 The 1908 Treaty included no clause regarding
termination, suggesting that the parties considered the Commissioners'
work completed and the Treaty satisfied when the boundary was "laid
down" and "marked. 25 1 The 1925 Treaty, on the other hand,
recognized that "boundary monuments deteriorate and at times are
destroyed or damaged," and that "changing conditions require from
time to time that the boundary be marked more precisely and plainly by
the establishment of additional monuments or the relocation of existing
monuments." 252 It thus provided that "the Commissioners appointed
under the provisions of [the 1908] Treaty shall continue to carry out the
provisions of this Article" after the completion of the first total marking
2 53
of the boundary.
Further evidence that the parties intended the position of
Commissioners to be ongoing is that, unlike the 1908 Treaty, the 1925
Treaty specified that the parties could terminate "upon twelve months'
written notice given by either Contracting Party to the other, and
following such termination the commissioners therein mentioned and
their successors shall cease to perform the functions thereby

emolument as a critical factor for whether one is an officer; however, the current understanding of
the Constitution and Court precedent is that emolument may be evidence of an office but is not a
necessary condition. See OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 38-40 (noting
that early federal officers received no regular compensation from the government, but instead the
authority to collect fees).
248. See Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 326-28 (1890) (finding that an appraiser is not
an "officer" because his "position is without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or
continuous duties, and he acts only occasionally and temporarily"); Germaine, 99 U.S. at 512.
249. OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 32 (quoting Bunn v. Illinois, 45
I11.
397, 405 (1867)).
250. See 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. IX.
251. See id. arts. II-VIII.
252. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. IV.
253. Id.
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prescribed. '2 54 Tellingly, the termination provision only allowed the
parties to terminate Article IV of the Treaty, which extended the
Commissioners' role indefinitely and provided for their replacement
"upon the death, resignation, or other disability of either of them." 255
This text, buoyed by the fact that Commissioners have been operating
continuously for the eighty-four years since the 1925 Treaty, shows that
for the purposes of the "continuing" prong of the "Officers of the
United States" analysis, the U.S. Commissioner is an officer.
One fact that supports the hypothesis that the nature of the U.S.
Commissioner changed with the passage of the 1925 Treaty is that,
while Senate-ratified, the 1908 "Treaty" was captioned as a
"Convention" in both the title of the agreement as well as the
concluding signature paragraph.2 56 While too much weight cannot be
given to the Treaty-Convention distinction because in other sections of
2 57
the 1908 text it refers to itself as both a "Convention" and a "Treaty,"
258
in contrast, the 1925 Treaty refers to itself only as a "Treaty."
Though the distinction today between a treaty and a convention is
essentially obsolete, 259 earlier in American history a distinction did
exist, and the distinction was based on the temporal length of the
agreement. 260 In any case, if "continuing" is what matters for the
Appointments Clause, the 1925 Treaty makes the U.S. Commissioner
"continuing" and, in fact, seems to make the office permanent.
The final and most difficult question is whether the significant
authority that the U.S. Commissioner possesses is "pursuant to the laws
of the United States." 26 1 To put the question another way: Is the U.S.
254. Id. art. V.
255. Id. arts. IV-V.
256. See 1908 Treaty, supra note 74.
257. Compare id. arts. I, IX, X ("Treaty") with id. at the title and signature area, referring to
the agreement as a "Convention."
258. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97. Again, this point cannot be given too much weight as the
1925 Treaty refers to the 1908 agreement as a "Treaty." Id.
259. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S.
331
[hereinafter
VCLT],
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/l-1_1969.pdf; Detlev F. Vagts,
InternationalAgreements, the Senate and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143,
150-51 (1998).
260. Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV.
133, 183, 198-99 (1998-1999). The Supreme Court has discussed this former difference, citing
Emer de Vattel: "A treaty, in Latin foedus, is a compact made with a view to the public welfare,
by the superior power, either for perpetuity, or for a considerable time ....
The compacts which
have temporary matters for their object, are called agreements, conventions, and pactions."
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571-72 (1840) (internal quotations omitted).
261. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) ("We think its fair import is that any
appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer
of the United States."').
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Commissioner something other than an officer because he is operating
under the authority of a "treaty," as distinct from a "law"? The short
answer to this question is that it presents a novel issue for which there
may be no clear answer. The OLC has noted that an office for which
the Appointments Clause applies will "ordinarily" be established under
the authority of a statute. 26 2 But, in rejecting a formalistic approach to
the inquiry, it has found that "whether an office has been established by
law does not turn on whether Congress has formally created an 'office'
by law, but rather on whether the two necessary elements of an office..
. ["delegated" and "continuing" authority] are present 'by law."' 26 3 It
continued, "The Constitution requires an examination of 'the nature of
the functions devolved upon' a position by legal authority, not the way
or form in which they are devolved. '26 4 Thus, generally, a formal
distinction between a statute and a treaty may not be required. The
OLC has, however, alluded to the treaty issue and used the boundary
commissioners under the Jay Treaty as examples of officials who were
not officers. 2 65 Specifically, some of the critics of the Jay Treaty
attacked it on the grounds that "the Appointments Clause prohibited the
creation of commissioners by treaty." 2 66 Hamilton responded to these
criticisms in a series of essays, which included the following statement
regarding the commissioner that the Jay Treaty empowered:
[They] are not in a strict sense OFFICERS. They are arbitratorsbetween the two Countries. Though in the Constitutions, both of the U
States and of most of the Individual states, a particular mode of appointing officers is designated, yet in practice it has not been deemed a
violation of the provision to appoint Commissioners
or special Agents
26 7
for special purposes in a different mode.
The OLC has thus concluded that "[a]t least where these [border
commissions] are created on an ad hoc or temporary basis, there is a
long historical pedigree for the argument that even the United States
representatives need not be appointed in accordance with Article 11.'268

262. See OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 36 (stating that an office
subject to the Appointment Clause will ordinarily have been "established by Law," either by a
statute or under the authority of a statute).
263. Id. at 37.
264. Id. (quoting State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546, 558 (1857)) (emphasis added).
265. See OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 25 (stating that the
commissioners appointed under the Jay Treaty serve as an example of positions that are not
offices); The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 124, 146-47 n.67 (1996) [hereinafter OLC, Separation of Powers].
266. OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 25.
267. Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. 37 (Jan. 6, 1796), reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 13, 20 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
268. See OLC, Separation of Powers, supra note 265, at 146-47 n.67 (emphasis added),

2009]

International Boundary Commission

Such a view could be damaging to a claim that the U.S.
Commissioner is an officer, 2 69 yet there are other key features that
distinguish the IBC Commissioner from those under the Jay Treaty.
First, the primary Appointments Clause criticism directed at the Jay
Treaty was not toward one of the three commissioners appointed by the
President, but, instead, at the deciding commissioner who was
appointed "by lot."' 270 From an Appointments Clause perspective, such
an appointment, essentially by the flip of a coin, is more troubling than
that of a presidential appointment specified in a treaty. Second, the
OLC has relied on this incident from the fallout of the Jay Treaty, not as
part of its argument that an officer exercising delegated authority under
U.S. law must be acting pursuant to a statute, but, instead, as a
component of its argument that to be an "Officer[] of the United States"
an official's tenure must not be temporary. 27 1 The incident thus cannot
provide dispositive guidance as to how someone with continuing,
delegated authority under a treaty-particularly a self-executing
treaty-should be classified. Finally, Hamilton made these arguments
as one whose "overriding concern was to ensure the respectability of the
new nation in the eyes of the European powers of the day," which
"required a set of constitutional doctrines and institutions that would
facilitate ... the nation's compliance both with the law of nations and
' 2 72
with its treaty obligations."
Another important fact in understanding the status of the U.S.
Commissioner is that Canada treats its commissioner as a government
officer and considers appointment and removal of the U.S.
Commissioner a matter of U.S. law. The IBC has explained that "[t]he
Canadian Commissioner" is "a full-time permanent employee of the
federal public service," who formally "reports directly to the Minister

269. Yet, if the Commissioner is not an "Officer" and is instead part of an international body,
it is unclear why the President would have the power to remove him at all. And, if the President
lacked any removal power, this could create potentially unconstitutional delegation problems.
270. The Jay Treaty, supra note 51, art. V.
271. OLC, Officers of the United States, supra note 217, at 25; Separationof Powers, supra
note 265, at 146-47 n.67.
272. David Golove, The Hamiltonian Constitution and Foreign Affairs, 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 107, 107 (2001). Hamilton's statement was made in defense of constitutional attacks on
the Jay Treaty, and it may be more accurately understood as political argument rather than
constitutional interpretation. Republicans were so angered with the Jay Treaty, which they
viewed as a political and diplomatic embarrassment to the recently victorious United States, see
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 136-37 (2002), that

they found "constitutional infirmities in virtually every provision in the treaty," an overreach
"which Federalists were ultimately to use to devastating advantage." See David M. Golove,
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundations of the Nationalist Conception of the
Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1162-63 (2000).
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for Foreign Affairs." 2 73 In addition, "the Canadian section of the
Commission is an administrative part of the Department of Natural
Resources." 274 While there is uncertainty as to how another country's
view of its own commissioner to an organization created by treaty
should inform the U.S. view of "Officer" status, 2 75 the fact that the
Canadian Commissioner is an officer does advise in favor of similar
treatment for the U.S. Commissioner. There is no evidence in either the
1908 or 1925 Treaty that the officials should be given different legal
status in each country. Further, the Government of Canada has
informed the State Department that it "considers the process of the
appointment, tenure, and termination of the U.S. Commissioner of the
IBC ...to be a matter within the sole purview of the U.S. Government"
276
and thus subject to U.S. law.
Two final indicia support the notion that the U.S. Commissioner is an
"Officer." First, in a 1954 application of the Annual and Sick Leave
Act of 1951, President Eisenhower exercised his discretion under the
Act to provide a list of "officers in the executive branch of the
Government" to whom the Act would not apply. 277 Eisenhower
included the IBC Commissioner as one of these "officers." 27 8 Second,
the 1925 Treaty, in describing the IBC, speaks of "Commissioners" in
all but one instance for which it references "commissioners." 2 79 The
interesting aspect of this capitalization choice is that, while using the
capitalized form nineteen times when describing the duties of what
would become the IBC, the one time that the drafters used the uncapitalized "commissioner" was in the section of the Treaty on the
relationship between the actual officer and his respective government:
The Contracting Parties further agree that each government shall pay
the salaries and expenses of its own commissioner and his assistants,
and that the expenses jointly incurred by the Commissioners in maintaining the demarcation of the boundary line in accordance with the

273. McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 3.
274. Id.
275. How one party to a treaty views its own officials is likely important under the VCLT, but
following the Supreme Court's decision in MedellIn it is debatable how much practical
significance a reviewing court would place on the VCLT analysis.
276. Declaration of Edward Alex Lee at 2, Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d
1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C07-0510). See also Declaration of Edwin R. Nolan at Ex. A,
Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (No. C07-0510) (stating that the Government of Canada considers the
appointment of the U.S. Commissioner to be within the discretion of the U.S. Government).
277. Act of July 2, 1953, ch. 178, 67 Stat. 136.
278. Exec. Order No. 10540, 19 Fed. Reg. 3983 (June 29, 1954). Eisenhower also included
the War Claims Commissioner that would become the issue in Wiener v. United States. 357 U.S.
349, 356 (1958).
279. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. IV.
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provisions
of this Article shall be borne equally by the two Govern280
ments.
It is possible that an analysis parsing whether "commissioner" is
capitalized, puts more weight on the text of the Treaty than it is able to
bear. 2 8 1 It is at least interesting, however, that the usage is different in
Article IV of the 1925 Treaty, particularly given the use of the
capitalized "Commissioners" in the same sentence when the Treaty is
again referring to the officials' acts that would be considered acts or
duties of the IBC itself. It is also interesting that the 1908 Treaty's
corresponding language capitalized the word "Commissioners," which
supports the idea discussed above that the 1925 Treaty, in making the
Commissioners permanent, changed their status to officers of their
respective governments. 28 2 Considering the U.S. Commissioner both a
U.S. "officer" in his role promoting U.S. interests at the IBC but an
agent of the internationally characterized IBC once the Commission has
made a decision and is acting pursuant to the 1908 and 1925 Treaties, is
a similar conceptual structure to the role of the U.S. Commissioner to
the IBWC which existed-then as the International Boundary
Commission-when the parties created the IBC.
After this analysis, it may be inescapable that whether the U.S.
Commissioner is an "Officer[]" turns on whether a treaty is a "law" for
purposes of the Appointment Clause analysis. If a treaty is not "law,"
this might actually suggest that the President has even less authority to
remove the Commissioner. This Article, however, argues that a treaty
should be considered "law" for the Appointments Clause analysis,
though the issue is likely an open question. 28 3 However, regardless of
280. Id.
281. Outside the treaty context, Professors Amar and Pfander have counseled against
attaching undue weight to punctuation or capitalization in textual interpretation, though both have
noted that it is occasionally relevant and sometimes dispositive. See Akhil Reed Amar, Our
Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 n.25 (1987) (arguing
that punctuation and capitalization differences are unlikely to result in significantly different
interpretations); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 217 n.50 (1985) (contending that the comma
following the word "fact" in the exceptions clause implies that the exception power applies to
appellate jurisdiction); James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001) (discussing Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, where he declared the power of judicial review from
the text of the Constitution); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Strippingand the Supreme Court's
Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1472 n. 172 (2000) (cautioning that
too much emphasis should not be placed upon capitalization when interpreting supervisory
powers).
282. 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. IX ("Each Government shall pay the expenses of its own
Commissioners and their assistants, and the cost of marking and monumenting the boundary shall
be paid in equal moieties by the two Governments.").
283. See supra notes 230-48, 261-91 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
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one's views, whether a treaty is deemed to be "law" may depend in
great part on whether the treaty is self-executing. Thus, this Article
engages in that necessary analysis below, determining that the 1908 and
2 84
1925 Treaties are self-executing.
But even if a treaty is not law the removal power jurisprudence
remains important as a way to think about the President's ability to
remove the U.S. Commissioner. If a self-executing treaty is not law, the
President would be unable to explicitly rely on his removal power if the
Commissioner were able to challenge his removal. Thus, the Leu
district court's decision and its focus on Myers and Shurtleff would be
inappropriate if the Commissioner was not an "Officer[] of the United
States" because he was not acting pursuant to "laws of the United
States." 2 85 Without an officer, and with appointment and removal
problems aside, the issue would simply be a matter of treaty
interpretation: whether the treaties allowed the President to remove the
Commissioner as well as whether the treaties created a right by which
some party could challenge removal in a U.S. court. The removal
power could be applicable to this interpretive discussion in terms of
how the President and Congress understood the treaty or what
normative values the court should promote if evidence from the treaties
is insufficient.
In sum, the removal power jurisprudence remains informative if the
U.S. Commissioner is not an "Officer[] of the United States" because
the same normative considerations of presidential control, executive
delegation, and bureaucratic expertise are in play. If, however, the
Commissioner is such an "Officer," as this Article concludes, the
removal power jurisprudence is directly authoritative.
B. The Removal Power Jurisprudence
Although the Constitution does not explicitly address the removal
power, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the constitutional
dimension of the power for more than two-hundred years. Whether a
limitation on the removal of the IBC Commissioner is constitutional is
critical because, regardless of what the 1908 and 1925 Treaties say, the

Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40 (1851) (declining to decide if a federal district court judge, sitting as a
"commissioner" hearing claims arising from the Spanish cession of Florida to the United States
pursuant to and so designated by the 1819 treaty was an officer of the United States, but finding
no problem with the fact that a treaty could so designate him).
284. See infra Part IV.
285. See Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205, 1207-08, 1212 (W.D.
Wash. 2007) (cautioning that too much emphasis should not be placed upon capitalization when
interpreting supervisory powers).
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Supreme Court recently reiterated that "the treaty-making power of the
United States 'does not extend so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids."' 286 Though there has been exhaustive academic
debate regarding the extent of unitarianism that the Constitution
requires, 287 there is general agreement that the removal power derives
from the Vesting Clause: "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." 2 88 And, to varying degrees,
scholars believe this argument is supported by the Take Care Clause:
"[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. 2 89 The First Congress, in what has come to be known as the
Decision of 1789, concluded that the President held a constitutionallyvested power to remove executive officers, 290 but it did not agree on a
lone textual source for the power.2 9 1 Though there were more than two
perspectives in the House debate, the crux of the argument focused on
whether the President could remove officers by himself,292 James
Madison's view, or if he needed the advice and consent of the Senate, as
originally advocated by Alexander Hamilton. 29 3 The implications of
286. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1382 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924)); see also AMAR, supra note 19, at 298 (discussing
the issue slavery posed for Southerners who wanted to maintain voting power without violating
the Constitution).
287. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 8-11, 23-32 (discussing the two viewpoints
concerning a unitary executive: one which posits that the President has unlimited power over the
execution of administrative functions, and another which argues Congress has a wide degree of
authority to structure the government).
288. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
289. Id. § 3. Under a third theory, the removal power is derived from the Appointments
Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.2, and "[tihe right to remove is an incident to the power of
appointment." Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 253 (1839). Commentators have
explained that this theory, while symmetrical, is not supported constitutionally, practically, or
historically. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 161 (1994) (contending that the removal tied to appointment
theory was implicitly discarded in Humphrey's Executor); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and
Tenure in Office, 92 VA.L.REV. 1779, 1834-36 (2006) (insisting that the President does not have
the power to remove all of the officials that he appoints, given that entities who select officials do
not necessarily have the authority to remove them because they appointed the officials). The
Supreme Court and recent administrations have seemed more reluctant to abandon this view
despite its deficiencies. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1988) (stating that
the Special Division's power to appoint officials is derived from the Appointments Clause); 7 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 95, 97-100 (1983) (contending that the President's removal power is based
upon the presumption that the power to appoint implies the power to remove).
290. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-15 (1926).
291. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 658 (2004) (stating that there was no consensus among
proponents of the President's removal power as to its source, given that some proponents
believed the power arose from the Article H Vesting Clause, while others believed that the
legislature could entrust the President with such power).
292. Myers, 272 U.S. at 119-33.
As secretary of the treasury in
293. THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the Decision of 1789 raise a number of important constitutional law
issues, many of which are outside the scope of this Article. Yet, live
issues in that debate, namely executive control, political accountability,
and checks and balances, are relevant for a normative discussion of
whether treaties can and should be able to provide outer limits to certain
executive removals.
Fourteen years after the Decision of 1789, Chief Justice Marshall
offered the first Supreme Court statement on the removal power in
Marbury v. Madison.294 Though writing in dicta, 29 5 Marshall viewed
the power narrowly-perhaps very narrowly by modern unitarians'
standards-finding that an appointment created vested legal rights to an
office. 2 96 Despite the lack of precedential weight in Marshall's
statement, the Court has employed the reasoning behind it-that
Congress may limit the removal power when the limitation does not
infringe on the President's Article II duties-in subsequent removal
297
decisions.
Though the cases arising out of twentieth century removals are most
important for this Article's analysis-partially because the earlier cases
often operated under a flawed premise of the removal power based on
the Appointment Clause 29 8-there is at least one additional nineteenth
century removal case that is relevant for analyzing the removal of the
IBC Commissioner. In Shurtleff v. United States,29 9 the Court held that
President McKinley did not violate a statutory, cause-based limit on the
President's removal of Ferdinand Shurtleff, an appraiser of merchandise
under the Customs Administrative Act, when President McKinley fired
him without providing cause for removal. 30 0
Assuming that the
Constitution allowed Congress to limit the removal power, the Court
Washington's Cabinet, Hamilton changed his view expressed therein. Prakash, supra note 289, at
1829.
294. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
295. Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1897).
296. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 162.
297. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1998) (discussing the Court's
decision in Humphrey's Executor, where it held that Congress' ability to condition the President's
removal power will depend upon the "character of the office"); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 162, 165-66)
(describing Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury as drawing a distinction between a
justice of the peace and an officer appointed to aid the President in the performance of his duties).
298. See, e.g., Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 314-15 (1903) (stating that the
President can remove an officer by virtue of his power of appointment); Parsons, 167 U.S. at 331
(describing the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment); Ex parte Hennen, 38
U.S. (3 Pet.) 230, 253 (1839) (insisting that the power to remove is essential to the power to
appoint).
299. 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
300. Id. at317-19.
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said that implying life tenure, as Shurtleff claimed, from the Customs
Administrative Act, required "very clear and explicit language," which

was not present in the statute.30 1 In looking for a clear statement, the
infrequency of life tenure and the absence of congressional intent to

pick the office of appraiser of merchandise for special consideration
drove the Court's decision. 30 2 While the so-called "presumption" in
Shurtleff has been relied on by proponents of a strong unitary executive
theory, 30 3 after the later removal cases, discussed below, 30 4 Shurtleff
"appeared confined to its factual setting,"305 or was, perhaps, "implicitly
revers[ed]."306
Continuing this view of expansive executive power, in Myers v.
United States, the Court, with a former President at its head,30 7
addressed the scope of the President's removal power more explicitly
than Marbury and Shurtleff.30 8 Frank S. Myers, a First Class
Postmaster in Portland, Oregon was removed as part of President
postmasters, 30 9
Republican
of
firing
Wilson's
Woodrow
notwithstanding a statute providing that a postmaster could only be
removed before the end of his term with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 3 10 Chief Justice Taft spent considerable length analyzing the
framers' debates, finding that the constitutional structure supported the
President's exclusive removal power. 3 1 1 Even Myers, however,
implicitly conceded that Congress possessed the power to shield inferior
officers, including those who served political functions, from plenary
3 12
presidential removal.

301. Id. at 315. The statute at issue, the Customs Administrative Act, read as follows:
"[T]here shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
nine general appraisers of merchandise .... They... may be removed from office at any time by
the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office... " Id. at 313.
302. Id. at 315-18.
303. E.g., Yoo, Calabresi, & Colangelo, supra note 14, at 631.
304. See infra notes 313-22 and accompanying text.
305. Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for the General Counsels of
the Federal Government, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and
Congress, May 7, 1996, reprintedin 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513 (2000).
306. See Yoo, Calabresi, & Colangelo, supra note 14, at 631 (stating that the Court in Weiner
implicitly reversed the presumption in Shurtleff against construing statutes as limiting removal
power).
307. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 297-98 (1965).
308. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
309. For background on the Myers firing, see Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers and its
Wayward Successors: Going Postal on the Removal Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES
165 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
310. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 107 (1926).
311. Id.atlO6,161.
312. See id. at 116, 173-74 (insisting that the Senate's appointment of inferior offices
prevents their classification into the merit system); see also Prakash, supra note 309, at 182 ("In
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The high-water mark of the Supreme Court's recognition of
presidential removal power in Myers lasted only nine years, as the Court
3 13
limited the scope of Myers in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.
Unlike Myers, over which the Court was divided,3 14 in Humphrey's
Executor the Court unanimously upheld Congress' authority to limit
removal of a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
3 15
to cases of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."
The Court drew a key distinction between "purely executive officers,"
such as the postmaster in Myers, for whom the President alone could
make removal decisions, and "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial"
officers, like those at the FTC, for whom Congress was able to constrain
the President's removal power. 3 16
Conceptually, this distinction
responded to the concern that if Congress was unable to check the
removal of "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" officers, the only
3 17
check on removal would be through judicial review.
The Court has since clarified that an officer's classification is not
dispositive in determining whether Congress can limit the President's
removal power; 3 18 however, the Court has not entirely abandoned its
reasoning in Humphrey's Executor. The Court deployed that reasoning in
Wiener v. United States,3 19 the next major removal power case. Wiener
expanded on Humphrey's Executor, holding that even if no statutory limit
on removal existed, the President may not be able to remove executive
officers where independence from the President is desirable. 3 20 Wiener
was a former member of the War Claims Commission. He was appointed
by President Truman, but President Eisenhower removed him without
cause. 32 1
The statute creating and governing the War Claims
Commission was silent on removal, but a unanimous Court held that the
President's removal authority over a "quasi-judicial" officer was not
short, nothing in Myers precluded congressional regulation of presidential removal of inferior
officers, including postmasters, in the future.").
313. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
314. Myers, 272 U.S. at 240 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 295 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
315. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 623. The Court referred to this standard as "for cause." Id.

at 629.
316. Id. at 629-32.
317. Id. at 629.
318. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-91 (1988) (stating that Congress' ability to
impose a restriction upon the President's removal power does not depend on whether the official
is "purely executive").
319. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
320. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 351-52 (2006) (describing the Court's
holding in Wiener as restricting the President from removing executive officials where
independence from the President is desirable, even without a statutory limit on removal).
321. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 350.
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plenary when there was reason that the officer should exert some
independence and that Congress may have assumed such independence
322
in drafting the statute.
Following Myers, Humphrey's Executory, and Wiener, it appeared as
though the Court had reached equilibrium in the removal debate. The
majority understanding of the removal power was that an officer
attempting to show that his removal exceeded the removal power had to
make two showings. 3 23 First, he had to show that he did not exercise
"purely executive" power because the President possesses "the
324
unrestrictable power . . . to remove purely executive officers."
Second, if he was able to demonstrate that, like Humphrey's Executor
and Wiener, he possessed "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" power,
he had to then show that Congress either explicitly limited the
President's removal power or that the Court could find such intent from
a clear purpose such as establishing independence or insulation from
3 25
direct executive oversight.
This understanding
was adjusted, and perhaps "wholly
eviscerated, 32 6 by the Court's most recent decision on the removal
power. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court rejected a challenge to the
constitutionality of the independent counsel ("IC") provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act. 3 27 Assistant AG, Theodore Olson, and two
other executive officers 32 8 brought the challenge to the IC Act, which
limited the Attorney General's removal of the IC to situations where the
AG had good cause. 329 Further, the Act required that after the AG
effected a removal, he would file a report with the House and Senate
322. Id. at 352, 354-56. The Court continued to rely on Wiener's function as the key issue in
the case, but Wiener remains important for its holding that where independence from the
President is desirable, the Court is more willing to find a limit to the removal power. See id. at
352-56.
323. Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F. 2d 1216, 1219 (3d Cir. 1988); see Kalaris v. Donovan, 697
F.2d 376, 389-91 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the removed members failed to show that
Congress had exercised its authority to limit the President's power of removal by creating an
Article III court).
324. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) (stating that the Myers
case sustains the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive officers).
325. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356 (stating that by passing the War Claims Act of 1948,
Congress did not want the President to have the ability to appoint Commissioners of his choosing
to the War Claims Commission).
326. See Prakash, supra note 309, at 192.
327. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-62 (1988). For background on Morrison, see
Kevin M. Stack, The Story of Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and Independent
Agencies in Watergate's Wake, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, supra note 309.
328. The other officers joining Olson were Edward Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, and
Carol Dinkins, Assistant AG for the Land and Natural Resources Division. Morrison, 487 U.S. at
665.
329. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
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Judiciary Committees describing the grounds for removal. The Court
conceded that Humphrey's Executor rejected some of the reasoning in
Myers by sanctioning removal limitations for officers performing
"quasi-judicial" or "quasi-legislative" functions,3 30 finding such limits
contrary to Myers. More specifically, Myers envisioned unfettered
presidential removal of any officer performing some "purely executive"
33
functions regardless of what other functions the officer performed. '
The Morrison Court could have reconciled Myers, Humphrey's
Executor, and Wiener while eliminating any doubt that Congress could

limit removal of certain officers, but instead the Court addressed the
removal question from an entirely different approach. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Morrison majority, 332 emphasized that the
question of whether Congress can limit the removal of an officer cannot
turn on the "rigid categories" of whether that officer is considered
333

"executive."

Rehnquist, taking a functional approach, instead

explained that the critical inquiry contains two steps: first, whether an
officer is a principal officer, for whom the Constitution requires

unlimited presidential removal, or an inferior officer for whom
Congress can create removal limitations. 334 Second, if the officer falls
into the latter category and Congress is able to impose removal
limitations, the question becomes whether the limitation on the removal
power with regard to that officer interferes with "the President's
exercise of the 'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed
duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article

330. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687-91 (stating that Congress may fix the terms of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial offices and forbid their removal without cause); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935).
331. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution That Wasn't, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 47, 52 (2004).
332. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659. Justice Scalia, alone, wrote an impassioned dissent that
focused on what he viewed as the only relevant inquiry: whether the Independent Counsel's
exercise of prosecutorial power was "executive" power, and, if it was, whether the Ethics in
Government Act deprived the President of any control over that power. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
333. Id. at 689-90. The Leus claimed that the U.S. Commissioner "solely performs Executive
functions" and does not engage in any activities that are "quasi judicial." Plaintiff's Response to
Motion to Quash at 10, Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(No. C07-0510). However, there is a possible counterargument based on Hamilton's claim that
boundary commissioners are more like arbitrators than officers. See supra note 267 and
accompanying text.
334. See Morrison, 487 U.S at 689-90. It is worth noting that the Morrison analysis occurred
in a purely domestic context and that interference of the executive power may be an easier
threshold to meet in the foreign affairs context. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 445 (1998) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936)) (stating that in relation to foreign affairs, the President has "a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved").
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''335
II.
Thus, Congress could neither limit the President's ability to
execute the laws, nor actually participate in the removal itself or review
the removal decision. 33 6 The Court recognized that Congress could,
33 7
however, create ex ante limits on the removal of inferior officers.
How this jurisprudence applies to removal limitations purportedly

created by treaty is unclear, but there are reasons to be more
comfortable with removal limitations for an inferior officer created by
treaty than those in a typical statute. If a self-executing treaty, like a
federal law or the Constitution itself, is the "supreme Law of the
land, 3 3 8 a treaty should be able to limit removal of inferior officers,3 39
though no court has addressed this issue. 340 While there is undoubtedly

tension between the removal cases, the Court's main concern has been
with instances in which Congress used legislation preemptively to assert
a role for itself in later removal confrontations. 34 1 When Congress has,
instead, created a situation in which a fired officer can challenge his
removal, the Court has allowed the limitations because such limitations
34 2
have not raised concerns with congressional aggrandizement.
335. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690.
336. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that Congress cannot remove
an officer through means other than impeachment because such power would give Congress
control over the execution of the laws).
337. This leaves the challenge for Congress, if it desires to create removal limitations,
twofold: identify whether an officer is an inferior officer, and if she is, tailor removal limits that
do not violate the principles from Morrison. Many commentators agree that Congress can
provide such limits on the removal of inferior officers. See, e.g., Christian M. Halliburton, The
Constitutional and Statutory Framework Organizing the Office of the United States Attorney, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213, 215 (2008); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 117-18 (stating that
Congress may immunize four categories of officials from presidential control: (1)high-level
officials who exercise foreign affairs powers; (2) officers who exercise adjudicative or ministerial
functions; (3) officials who have conflicts of interest; and (4) domestic officials who can be
controlled through policy directions of the President); see also Steven Breker-Cooper, The
Appointments Clause and the Removal Power: Theory and Sgance, 60 TENN. L. REV. 841, 861
(1993) ("Congress's ability to fetter the President's discretion in removing inferior officers has
never been seriously doubted.").
338. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
339. But see infra note 344 and accompanying text.
340. If one looks for a bicameralism problem similar to INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
that concern is less compelling here where the substantive issue comprises two areasappointment (and removal) and treaty-making-for which the Senate is constitutionally-required
to act without the input of the House of Representatives. Further, unlike Chadha, the issue in the
present case is not that either house of Congress could act to constrain the President.
341. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726 (holding that Congress cannot reserve the power to remove
an officer by means other than impeachment, as such power would essentially permit Congress to
execute laws); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59 (stating that the one-House veto purporting to
review Executive action essentially constituted a judicial act and therefore was unconstitutional);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (insisting that the Court has never held that
Congress holds the power to remove); Magill, supra note 331, at 52 (stating that the Congress
may indirectly limit the President's removal power by providing tenure protection).
342. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (holding that the Ethics and Government
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Second, normative concerns of bicameralism are not as much at issue
when the position of the Commissioner to the IBC is one that is created
without the approval of the House of Representatives. So, as long as the
removal limitations created by a Senate-ratified treaty comport with 3the
43
limitations set out in the cases above, the Article I power is retained.
C. The InternationalBoundary Commission Commissioner is an
Inferior Officer
Having concluded that the U.S. Commissioner to the IBC is an
"Officer[] of the United States," this Section argues that he is an inferior
officer. The Constitution uses but fails to define the term "inferior

Officer," and recognition of the difficulty in defining who is an inferior
The Supreme Court has interpreted the
officer is not new. 34 4
345
two classes of executive officers.
creating
as
Clause
Appointments
"Principal officers" are those who the President nominates "with the
advice and consent of the Senate." 346 In contrast, Congress may vest
the appointment of inferior officers in a department head or the
President alone and Congress is thus empowered to limit the President's
34 7
removal power.
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court created competing precedents
that arguably muddy the waters as to which officers are inferior officers.
In Morrison, the Court declined to provide a generally applicable line
between principal and inferior officers in finding that the IC under the
Ethics in Government Act was an inferior officer. The Court did,
however, base its finding on the following factors: the IC held his office
subject to removal by the AG; 3 48 he possessed limited duties; his
Act does not serve as an attempt by Congress to remove officials, but instead places the power of
removal in the hands of the Executive Branch); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56
(1958) (holding that the War Claims Commission was a constitutionally permissible commission
created by Congress to adjudicate the legal claims of those who had been removed); Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935) (holding that Congress has the authority to
fix the terms of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial offices).
343. See Kart, supra note 10 (quoting Ellioit Feldman, "Those treaties have represented our
security on the northern border for 100 years, and the president has chosen to side with a private
property group over national security.").
344. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
362 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston: Little, Brown, and Company 5th ed. 1891) (stating that
there is no exact line drawn between those who are inferior officers and those who are not).
345. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1878).
346. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976). Some inferior officers are appointed by
advice and consent, but this is the result of Congress choosing to impose that method of
appointment by statute. See id.
347. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl.2; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988).
348. This factor is surprisingly circular: an officer may be inferior because the duration of her
office can be limited through removal by another officer, but Congress can only attach removal
limitations-temporal limits, for example-to an officer's position if they are an inferior officer.
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authority was tempered by DOJ policy;349his jurisdiction was not plenary;
and his tenure was temporally limited.
After Morrison, the Supreme Court revisited its parsing of principal
and inferior officers in Edmond v. United States.3 50 The Edmond Court
upheld the Secretary of Transportation's appointment of U.S. Coast
Guard Court of Appeals judges, holding that such judges are inferior
officers primarily because a politically accountable principal officer
supervises the judges' work. The Court focused not on whether there
was an officer who was formally designated as superior to the alleged
inferior officer. Instead, the Court explained the issue by stating that
within "the context of a Clause designed to preserve political
accountability relative to important Government assignments, we think
it evident that 'inferior officers' are officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate." 3 5 1 Like many
commentators, the DOJ opined that the Court failed to provide clear
guidance for what constitutes an inferior officer. 3 52 OLC also agreed
with courts analyzing Morrison in light of Edmond in finding that the
list of
Morrison factors do not constitute an exclusive or exhaustive
35 3
considerations as to the proper categorization of an officer.
Under either a Morrison or an Edmond analysis, the U.S.
Commissioner would be an inferior officer. Under the Morrison
analysis, the IBC itself, and by extension its Commissioners, have
authority over a very specific, limited subject, measured by substantive
control, geography, or budget. 354 While the power over territory is
significant, 355 the U.S. Commissioner's authority is offset almost
3 56
entirely by the narrow scope of the 1908 and 1925 Treaties.
The question is closer under Edmond, however, because one could
argue that the structure of the IBC makes it such that the U.S.
Commissioner's work is neither directed nor supervised by another
politically accountable actor who was appointed by the President with
349. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
350. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661-64 (1997).
351. ld. at 663.
352. OLC, Separation of Powers, supra note 265, at 149. Akil Amar and Stephen Calabresi
have questioned whether Edmond can be reconciled with the inferior officer analysis in Morrison,
concluding that it cannot. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 810
(1999); Steven G. Calabresi, The StructuralConstitution and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty,
22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 5 (1998).
353. See OLC, Separation of Powers, supra note 265, at 150.
354. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (describing the narrow scope of authority
of the IBC).
355. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 37-42, 91-103 and accompanying text.
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the Senate's advice and consent. 35 7
On one hand, the U.S.
Commissioner has as much if not more "supervision" than the
Independent Counsel at issue in Morrison. However, within the
Edmond analysis, the claim of supervision is questionable. In some
ways, the U.S. Commissioner is able to act without supervision from the
Secretary of State, which is, in fact, one of the purposes of the Treaties.
However, in an important way, the 1925 Treaty retains supervision. If
the State Department views the IBC Commissioner as a rogue actor who
is not following the Treaty, then the Secretary of State can recommend
that the President terminate the Treaty pursuant to its provisions. The
same action may also occur where, as here, the executive branch makes
a determination that the Commissioner is following the Treaty, but that
it is nevertheless so opposed to the Commissioner's actions that it is
prepared to suffer any political fallout from terminating the Treaty. Of
course, this has the effect of ending the Commissioner's tenure. 358 One
cannot object to viewing this ultimate removal through Treaty
termination as failing to "supervise" and "direct" without questioning
the efficacy of the entire removal power, which is predicated on the fact
that the power to remove is the power to control.3 5 9
The inferior officer interpretation of the Commissioner is further
supported by a potential reviewing court's desire to interpret the 1908
and 1925 Treaties so as not to violate the Constitution. If the
Commissioner is considered an officer with continuing, delegated
authority-i.e., if he exercises "significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States" 36 0-there may be an Appointments Clause
issue with the President appointing the Commissioner without Senate
advice and consent. Because courts should generally interpret a treaty
to which the U.S. is a party as not violative of the Constitution if one
plausible interpretation would render the treaty permissible, 36 1 the
357. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661-64 (1997).
358. See 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. V. In the State Department's own words from a 1977
memo, the IBC is subject to "ultimate overall review by the Secretary [of State]," see Reply on
Motion to Quash, supra note 198, at 27, and the IBC has described the U.S. Commissioner as
"report[ing] to the Secretary of State." Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 24, Leu v.
Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C07-0510).
359. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 83 (citing 13 REG. DEB. 431-32 (1837)
(Expunging Debate)).
360. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126(1976).
361. Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-SelfExecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589 & n.154 (2003); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CRS STUDY: TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 70-71 (2001) [hereinafter TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS]; Julian G. Ku, Medellin's Clear Statement Rule: A Solution for International
Delegations, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 614 (2008); Covey T. Oliver, The Essence of Federalism
and Its Bearing Upon the Enforcement of InternationalAgreements by a Federal State, in 141
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preferable option is to recognize that the Commissioner is an inferior
officer: (1) whose work is supervised by the Secretary of State, (2)
whose scope is limited by the IBC Treaties, 3 62 and (3) who remains
politically accountable, not through direct intervention by the State
Department but through the State Department's ability to recommend
that the President terminate the 1925 Treaty by giving notice to Canada,
3 63
as the Treaty provides.
IV.

SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

COMMISSION: DID THE 1908

AND

1925 TREATIES LIMIT REMOVAL?

Despite early, eloquent statements from the Supreme Court, whether
a treaty is self-executing remains a vexing yet necessary inquiry that
complicates the analysis of the propriety of the removal of
Commissioner Schornack. 364 If the IBC Treaties are not self-executing
it is much more difficult to claim that the U.S. Commissioner is an
"Officer" exercising "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States." 365 Section IH.A explains the Court's current framework
for determining whether a treaty is self-executing. Section III.B argues
that under this framework the 1908 and 1925 Treaties are self-executing
based on their text, negotiating history, and postratification
understanding. That the only appellate court to consider the issue held
3 66
that the Treaties are self-executing further supports this contention.
RECUEIL DES COURS [Collected Courses] 346, 352 (1974). But see Caleb Nelson, Comment, The
Treaty Power and Self-Execution: A Comment on Professor Woolhandler's Article, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 801, 815-16 (2002).
362. "IBC Treaties" is used to describe the 1908 and 1925 Treaties collectively.
363. See 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. V.
364. The Court first discussed the self-executing issue in Foster v. Neilson in 1829. See 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51
(1833)). Yet more than one hundred years later, the issue was still problematic. At a meeting of
the American Society of International Law in 1951, Myres McDougal, the legendary Yale Law
School Professor, stated, "[T]his word 'self-executing' is essentially meaningless, and . . . the
quicker we drop it from our vocabulary the better for clarity and understanding." Myres
McDougal, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr.
27, 1951), 45 ASIL PROC. 101, 102 (1951). The Supreme Court, however, appears content to
continue to put great weight on the self-executing analysis despite commentators' criticisms.
BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 244 (4th ed. 2006);
Shapiro, supra note 15, at 98. Compare Aya Gruber, Who's Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1017 (2007), with Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). For one of the most recent
criticisms of the Court, see Jordan J. Paust, Medellin, Avena, The Supremacy of Treaties, and
Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 301, 326-28 (2008).
365. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. Further, it would be more difficult to find any way to enforce
the Treaties except through Canadian action at international law. Practically, such action, lacking
something like the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, see Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/10
(Dec. 12, 2001), would have to occur through diplomatic channels.
366. See Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., 120 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1941).
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A. The Supreme Law of the Land, Self-Executing Treaties, and
Medellfn v. Texas
Although it is not clear from the text of the Constitution that there is a
distinction between treaties that have automatic force in domestic law
and those that do not, such a distinction has existed nearly since the
Founding. 36 7 The Supremacy Clause states that, like the Constitution
and federal statutes, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land.
. . ."368 In discussing-and really introducing-the distinction between
treaties that have immediate application and those requiring legislative
action to have binding effect domestically, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote, "Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision." 36 9 Marshall explained, however, that not all
treaties were immediately the law of the land upon their ratification:
"But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself
to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
'3 70
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
In the Supreme Court's next attempt to address this distinction, the
Head Money Cases, the Court emphasized the now frequently-quoted
idea that "[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent
nations. It depends, for the enforcement of its provisions, on the interest
and the honor of the governments which are parties to it."' 37 1 The Court
did, however, recognize the existence of self-executing treaties, and the
primary holding was that there is nothing inherent to treaties that makes
them supreme to federal legislation. 37 2 Until 2008, these statements
were some of the most authoritative guidance on whether a treaty was
self-executing. One commentator summed up the resulting confusion,
stating that "[t]he distinction between 'self-executing' and 'non-self3 73
executing' treaties is more easily stated than applied.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the confusion over the
distinction between treaties that are self-executing and those that are not
367.
368.
369.
United
370.
371.
372.
373.

DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 171 (2d ed. 2006).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829), overruled on other grounds by
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
Id.
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
Id. at 599.
WESTON ET AL., supra note 364, at 244.
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in Medellin v. Texas.3 74 In Medellin,3 75 the Court rejected the appeal of
Jose Ernesto Medellfn, who was convicted of murder in Texas and was
one of fifty-one Mexican nationals named in the ICJ's decision in Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.37 6 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider, inter alia, whether "the ICJ's
judgment in Avena [is] directly enforceable as domestic law in a state
court." 3 77
The Court held that Avena did not constitute "directly
enforceable federal law that pre-empt[s] state limitations on [the] filing
of successive habeas petitions" in part because neither the Optional
37 8 the United Nations Charter, 379
Protocol to the Vienna Convention,
nor the ICJ Statute, 3 80 created binding federal law without
381
implementing legislation.
The Medellin Court first addressed the issue of self-executing treaties
in broad terms. It explained that "while treaties 'may comprise
international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless
Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on those
terms."' 3 82 The Court reiterated that "a treaty is 'equivalent to an act of
the legislature,' and hence self-executing when it 'operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision.' 38 3 To the Medellin
majority, 384 a self-executing treaty was one that "has automatic

374. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
375. Medellin was one of the Court's recent consular rights cases. See also Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (holding Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR")
did not authorize remedy of suppression of evidence gathered in violation of right of consular
notification and communication); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (dismissing certiorari
of claim for violation of VCCR consular notification rights, where plaintiff had remaining
recourse in state courts); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (denying habeas and certiorari
petitions of plaintiff scheduled for execution, where plaintiff alleged violations of VCCR right of
consular notification).
376. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31). In Avena, the ICJ had held that Medellin and others were entitled to judicial review of
their sentences and state-court convictions. Id.
377. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
378. See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.325 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
379. See U.N. Charter art. 92.
380. See Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055.
381. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
382. Id.at 1356.
383. Id. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 315
(1829)).
384. There has been significant reaction to Medellin, much of it negative, or at least calling for
a narrow interpretation of the case. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the
Land: The Supremacy Clause and the JudicialEnforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599,
602, 649 (2008); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term - Leading Cases, 122 HARv. L. REV. 435
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domestic effect as federal law upon ratification." 3 85 Thus, "a 'non selfexecuting' treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable
federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effects depends upon
38 6
implementing legislation passed by Congress."
In order to remedy the Court's overly vague definition of selfexecuting treaties, the Medellin majority laid down factors to consider
when examining whether a treaty is self-executing. According to the
Court, "[t]he interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a
statute, begins with its text." 387 In addition to text, the Court cited two
"aids to its interpretation" in deciding whether a treaty is self-executing:
"the negotiating and drafting history of the treaty as well as 'the
postratification understanding' of signatory nations."388
Under the analytical framework that it created, the Court found that
the text of the Optional Protocol was a "bare grant of jurisdiction" and
neither spoke to the effect of ICJ decisions nor required State-parties to
The Court thus dismissed the domestic
comply with them.3 89
enforceability of the Optional Protocol, though it did not discuss it
specifically in terms of self-execution. The Court did answer the selfexecuting question in the negative as to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter,
relying on the language that "[e]ach Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which
it is a party. ' '3 90 The Court agreed with the Government's interpretation
of this language, finding that it was a "commitment on the part of U.N.
members to take future action through their political branches to comply
with an ICJ decision." 39 1 While the Court focused on its interpretation
of this text, it supported its decision by noting that the executive branch,
when it signed the U.N. Charter, understood that the United States could
veto the enforceability of any ICJ judgment through its Security Council
veto. The Court relied heavily on the "undertakes to comply" language,
(2008). Because this Article finds that the 1908 and 1925 Treaties are self-executing even under
the majority's reasoning in Medellin, it is even more likely that the treaties would be selfexecuting if the Medellin dissent were to prevail in a subsequent case. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at
1380-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
385. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 n.2. In contrast, "[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing
[when] they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect." Id. at 1356
("[treaty]" is bracketed in the opinion language).
386. Id. at 1356 n.2.
387. Id. at 1357.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1358. The text of the Optional Protocol at issue was as follows: "Disputes arising
out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice." Optional Protocol, supra note 378, art. I.
390. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (quoting U.N. Charter, supra note 379, art. 94(1)).
391. Id. at 1358 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928)).
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but it also used its second "aid to interpretation," arguing that its
conclusion was "confirmed by the 'postratification understanding' of
the signatory nations. '"392 Finally, the Court emphasized that Medellfn
Parties to the Optional Protocol that
did not identify any of the 171 State
39 3
viewed ICJ judgments as binding.
B. The 1908 and 1925 Boundary Treaties are Self-Executing Under the
Medellfn Analysis
Applying the first part of the Medellin analysis-an examination of
the text-to the 1908 and 1925 Treaties provides some evidence that
they were intended to be self-executing. The Medellin Court placed
significant weight on the fact that while the United States had submitted
to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, it had not explicitly stated that it would be
bound by the ICJ's decisions. 3 94 The 1908 and 1925 Treaties are easily
As to the Commissioners-created
distinguishable on their face.
boundary line, the 1908 Treaty states that the line the Commissioners
define will be "laid down" and "deemed to be the international
boundary as defined and established" under the treaty. 395 Further,
unlike the Option Protocol at issue in Medellin, which was "silent as to
any enforcement mechanism," 39 6 the 1908 Treaty provided that if the
Commissioners could not agree on the boundary then the matter was to
go to a neutral arbitrator, whose "decision shall be final, and the line
shall be laid down and marked by said Commissioners in accordance
therewith and as herein provided. ' 39 7 Finally, the Treaties are detailed
as to how the IBC is supposed to work. The 1908 Treaty, for example,
addresses minor issues such as the burden of proof of a party claiming
that particular islands are under the jurisdiction of one sovereign or
3 98
another.
These clues from the text of the 1908 and 1925 Treaties that they
were to be self-executing are further supported by the "aids to
interpretation" that were relevant to the Court in Medellin. The first aid
was the "negotiating and drafting history." As a starting point, if the
text clearly shows that the treaties are self-executing, why would the
Senate or the negotiators spend a great deal of time discussing whether
a treaty was self-executing? Despite this, in a letter to the Chairman of

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1358.
1908 Treaty, supra note 74, arts. I-VIII.
Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1358.
1908 Treaty, supra note 74, arts. 1-11.
Id. art. I1.
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Borah, Secretary of
State Frank Kellogg, describing the 1925 Treaty, emphasized that one
of the main "points dealt with" in the Treaty was that final boundary
decisions were to be made by the Commissioners "appointed under the
Treaty of 1908 and their successors in office as provided in the Treaty
under consideration." 39 9
Further, the Court in Medellin placed
importance on the United States' veto power over an ICJ decision,
40 0
which had to be enforced by the Security Council through its veto.
In contrast, the 1908 and 1925 Treaties provided that if the
Commissioners' "final" determination did not result in consensus, then
the matter would be referred to an arbitrator, who could be appointed by
a third Power if the United States and Canada did not agree, whose
decision "shall befinal. 4 °1
A relevant comparison for the backdrop to the negotiating history of
the 1908 Treaty is, again, the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, which
created the IJC. 4 02 Though creating a bilateral commission similar to
the IBC, the IJC has conceded that the Boundary Waters Treaty is likely
not self-executing. 40 3 A closer examination of the language of the
Boundary Waters Treaty, indeed reveals that key differences between
the language used in the 1908 IBC Treaty and 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty counsels that the drafters were attempting to do different things
in each document. The IBC Treaty uses compulsory language in
describing the Commissioners' tasks, frequently invoking "shall" and
"final," in addition to providing that if the Commissioners cannot agree,
the matter "shall" go to arbitration by a third party. In contrast, the
Boundary Waters Treaty, in describing the IJC, omits such directives
and leaves many questions open ended. It speaks primarily of the IJC's
reporting duties and prescribes that if the Commissioners split three-tothree in a vote, they will issue separate reports and the United States and
Canada "shall thereupon endeavor to agree upon an adjustment of the
question or matter of difference." 40 4 The Boundary Waters Treaty also
states that any other issues "involving ... the inhabitants ... along the
common frontier" are to be heard by the IJC; however, the report of the
IJC on hearing the dispute "shall not be regarded as decisions of the
399. 67 CONG. REc. 187-88 (1925) (letter from Sec. of State Frank B. Kellogg to Sen.
William E. Borah).
400. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1360.
401. 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, arts. I-H (emphasis added).
402. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 152.
403. See Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Devils Lake Case,
Determination in Accordance With Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation, SEM-06-002 (Aug. 21, 2006).
404. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 152, art. VI.
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questions or matters so submitted either on the facts or the law, and
shall in no way have the character of an arbitral award. '40 5 Simply put,
the Treaty creating the IJC was drafted with paradigmatic non-self40 6
executing language that is absent from the 1908 and 1925 Treaties.
Similarly, like the negotiating history, a comparison between the
"postratification understanding" of the 1908 Treaty and the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty illustrates the self-executing nature of the IEC
Treaties. The "postratification understanding" of the treaties creating
the IBC shows that the parties considered the treaties to be selfexecuting. In Article IX of the 1908 Treaty, the Commissioners are
instructed to "proceed without delay" in fulfilling the requirements of
Shortly after the ratification of the treaties, the
the Treaty. 40 7
Commissioners did in fact meet, and in 1908, the Commissioners
reached agreements on the manner in which the boundary was to be
marked, including the width of the boundary vista. They did not wait
for implementing legislation. 40 8 On the other hand, shortly after the
ratification of the Boundary Waters Treaty, Secretary of State Philander
Knox wrote to President Taft: "[L]egislation should be enacted that will
enable the Government of the United States to meet and carry out its
obligations under the treaty. . . . The legislation should provide the
manner of appointment of three United States commissioners [on the
IJC]." '40 9 Congress obliged, quickly passing legislation relating to the
4 10
IJC.
Further, in Article IV of the 1925 Treaty, the U.S. and Great Britain
agreed that "the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of the
Treaty of April 11, 1908, are hereby jointly empowered and directed: to
inspect the various sections of the boundary line . . . to keep the
boundary vistas open ...."41llThe Treaty defined the line that the
Commissioners had to keep open as the line "defined by the present
405. Id. art. IX. The IJC can issue binding decisions but only on referred matters under Article
X and only if both parties consent; and further, this "binding" dispute resolution has never been
invoked. Gov't of Province of Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41, 56 (D.D.C. 2005).
406. A topically related but temporally distinct treaty that lends support is the U.S.-Canadian
agreement that created the GLFC. See Fisheries Convention, supra note 190. The agreement,
which, like the IBC treaties created a binational organization to regulate U.S.-Canadian border
issues, includes the following language that is different from the 1908 and 1925 Treaties: "The
Contracting Parties agree to enact such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to the
provisions of this Convention." Id. art. XI; see Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956, ch. 358, 70 Stat.
242 (1956).
407. 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. IX.
408. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111(4) (1987) (indicia of non-self-executing treaties).
409. S. DOC. NO. 61-561, at 1-2 (1910).
410. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 384, 36 Stat. 703, 766.
411. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. IV.
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treaty and treaties heretofore concluded, or hereafter to be
concluded. 4 12 There was no statement or expectation that any further
implementing legislation was needed, and later changes were
contemplated as "treaties." The State Department has considered the
IBC's approval to be independent and necessary for construction along
the boundary, noting that in addition to a "Presidential Permit" for
construction along the U.S.-Canadian border, IBC approval "is required
for all projects within 10 feet of the United States-Canadian boundary..
"413

In addition to this text, negotiating history, and postratification
understanding, in Pettibone v. Cook County, Minnesota, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected a taxpayer-plaintiff s
argument that the 1908 Treaty was not self-executing; rather, the court
explicitly found that it was self-executing. 4 14 In Pettibone, taxpayers
had been paying property taxes on islands in a boundary lake to Cook
County, mistakenly thinking that their land was located in that
county. 4 15 When they discovered that their property was in Canada,
while attempting to sell it, they sued the county to recover the taxes.
The county answered that the payments were voluntary and that the
mistake was mutual. The court found for the county primarily on
statute of limitations grounds. 4 16 In so doing, the Eighth Circuit
considered the question of self-execution to be clear: "The Treaty of
1908 had the force and effect of law." 4 17 The court further stated that
the 1908 Treaty had "the same force and effect as an act of legislation
[even] whenever the treaty operates of itself without legislative
4 18
provisions."
Pettibone is even more instructive when considered against the
backdrop of the Head Money Cases. The Medellin Court relied on the
language from the Head Money Cases that equated non-self-executing
treaties to contracts between sovereigns providing no actionable
right. 4 19 However, in the same paragraph of the Head Money Cases
that is often used to reject a claim that a treaty is self-executing, the

412. Id.
413. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, Presidential Permits from the Department of State
for Facilities on the U.S.-Canada Border, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2009/114990.htm
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
414. Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., 120 F.2d 850, 854-55 (8th Cir. 1941).
415. Id. at 851.
416. Id. at 854-55.
417. Id. at 854.
418. See id. (citing United States v. The Schooner Peggy, I Cranch 103 (1801)).
419. Medellfn v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (quoting Edye v. Robertson (The Head
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
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Court reinforced that some treaties are self-executing and gave an
example:
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights
upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law,
and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the
courts of the country. An illustration of this character is found in treaties, which regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the
contracting nations in regard to rights of property by descent or inheritance, when the individuals concerned are aliens.... A treaty, then, is
a law of the land as an act of congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may
be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in
a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty
for a rule of decision
420
for the case before it as it would to a statute.
This example, which the Court found paradigmatic enough to use as
its primary example of a self-executing treaty, has significant
similarities with the creation of the IBC under the 1908 and 1925
Treaties. The 1908 and 1925 Treaties have an effect on individual
property rights, like municipal law, and have supplied the dispositive
rule of decision for the one court, Pettibone, that has heard a challenge
to property rights affected by the Treaties. 42 1 To the extent that the
language from the Head Money Cases is used to support the
interpretation of a treaty as non-self-executing, the other language,
quoted above, from the same paragraph as the more frequently cited
instruction, should not be ignored.
Two final counterarguments are instructive but ultimately invalid.
The first argument concedes that the majority of the 1908 and 1925
Treaties are self-executing, but that the portions covering removal are
not. If one reads Medellin to require the extreme position that every
provision in a treaty must include explicit language that it is selfexecuting, then this creates an almost impossible test for self-execution,
particularly for older treaties which were rarely drafted at that level of
specificity. 4 2 2
More likely, and more appropriately, the correct
approach is to view a treaty as a whole in determining whether an
individual provision should be self-executing. Plainly, the 1908 and
1925 Treaties, taken whole, are drafted as self-executing agreements.

420. The HeadMoney Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.
421. See supra notes 414-18 and accompanying text.
422. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1361-62 (discussing the majority's textual approach to selfexecution).
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Yet, even if Medellin is read to require textual clues in each article of
a treaty that it is self-executing, the IBC Treaties can meet this high
standard. The Medellin Court emphasized the language that each party
to the U.N. Charter "undertakes to comply" with the decision of the ICJ
if it is a party to that decision. 4 23 This Article has already distinguished
the "final" setting of the boundary called for in the Treaties, 4 24 but the
removal article is also distinguishable. In the 1908 Treaty, Article IX
states that if there is a vacancy caused "by reason of death, resignation,
or other disability" such vacancy "shall be filled forthwith ... and the
Commissioner so appointed shall have the same powers and obligations
as the Commissioner originally appointed. 4 2 5 There is no other reason
for removal. The 1925 Treaty also states that after the survey is
completed, "the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of the
Treaty shall continue to carry out the provisions of this Article." 4 26 The
IBC Treaties thus use language of immediate commitment for which the
Medellin Court was looking. As such, the IBC Treaties should be
considered self-executing under even the most extreme reading of
Medellin's demanding textual approach.4 2 7
Lastly, the potential counterargument to the conclusion that the 1908
and 1925 Treaties are self-executing is that Canada passed the 1960
International Boundary Commission Act ("IBCA"), 4 28 and one could
potentially, though incorrectly, construe the IBCA as demonstrating that
Canada considers the Treaties as not self-executing. Such a claim is
initially dubious because whether a treaty is self-executing or not is a
domestic law decision, and even if the IBC Treaties did not have the
force of domestic law in Canada, that would not necessarily be the case
in the United States. 4 29 One could, however, respond that Canada's
need to pass this legislation indicated postratification conduct that
counseled against U.S. acceptance of the IBC Treaties as selfexecuting. 430 This response ignores Canada's view that treaties "are not
automatically the law of the land" and "a change in the law is required
to implement a treaty obligation." 4 3 1 In any case, the IBCA is a brief

423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
inquiry
foreign
431.

Id. at 1358.
See supra notes 63, 69 and accompanying text.
1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. IX. (emphasis added).
1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. IV.
See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1346, 1358.
International Boundary Commission Act, R.S.C., c. 1-16 (1985) (Can.).
See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 97 (stating that the "postratification understanding"
is one of the "rare instances" after Medellin "where it is fully appropriate to query how
polities look at the law").
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 92 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds. 2005).
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Act addressing mostly minor issues. 432 Such minor clarifications that
neither approach the substance of the Treaties nor address any issue of
the Commissioners' appointment or removal, cannot be used to justify a
claim that the IBC Treaties are not self-executing in the United States.
This conclusion comports with Canada's view that the IIBC is a
"permanent international organization whose sole concern is the
physical maintenance of a line that separates two national
'433
sovereignties.
C. The Removal Power and the Commissioner to the International
Boundary Commission
If it is possible for the executive branch and Congress to agree to
removal limitations as part of a treaty, for Commissioner Schornack and
the IBC, the issue becomes whether the 1908 and 1925 Treaties did
create such a limitation. The text of the Treaties is the most informative
guide. For the purposes of this Article, however, the actual fate of
Commissioner Schornack and his ability to challenge his removal is not
the primary concern. The concern here is structural, specifically the
relation between treaties and the removal power, and the bounds of the
President's removal power more generally.
In examining the 1908 and 1925 Treaties, Medellin, again, provides
the Supreme Court's most recent statement on treaty interpretation. The
pivotal factor in this analysis is the treaty's text. 43 4 The Medellin Court
conceded, however, that its approach might fall between what
international law scholars would consider an "ordinary meaning textual
approach" and an "ordinary meaning contextual approach, ' 4 3 5 which
allows consideration of the "negotiation and drafting history of the
treaty" in addition to "'the postratification understanding. ' 436 The
Court approvingly cited Air France v. Saks in which the Court
reaffirmed its earlier statement that "'treaties are construed more
liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we
may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
4 37
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties."'

432. International Boundary Commission Act, R.S.C., c. 1-16 (1985) (Can.). Such minor
issues include that IBC workers may cross private property to reach the boundary and that except
with express permission from the IBC parties cannot build within ten feet of the boundary in
Canada. Id.
433. McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 1.
434. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
435. WESTON ET AL., supra note 364, at 100-01.
436. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217,
226 (1996)).
437. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v.
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The Court is also informed in its treaty interpretation by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"). 43 8 The VCLT provides:
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose." 4 39 Such a requirement is at
least similar to the Court's approach in Medellin, to look first at the text
of the treaty, then at the circumstances of its negotiation and drafting
(ordinary meaning in context), and finally at the postratification
understanding (object and purpose).
In considering these questions the Leu district court did address the
removal cases but only in dicta. Instead, the court focused on whether
440
the 1908 and 1925 Treaties granted privately enforceable rights.
Private enforceability is distinct from self-execution, 44 1 and this issue
grounded the court's opinion that Commissioner Schornack did not
have a cause of action to bring the case. 44 2 Because the district court
focused on the individual enforceability of treaty rights, it only
mentioned in passing that under Wiener (and contrary to Shurtleff), it
can be argued that for the small number of independent regulatory
agencies for which Congress has not specified the grounds for removal,
the President does not have the removal power for these officers, even
in the face of congressional silence on the power of removal, because
the commissioners and heads of these agencies are not "purely
executive officers." 44 3 The district court also failed to reach the
question of whether the treaties can or did limit removal because of its
reliance on the individual rights limitation; however, the court noted
that "the language and purposes of the 1908 and 1925 Treaties support
Commissioner Schornack's 444
argument that he is insulated from the
President's removal power."
Because this Article is focused on the structural interaction of the
treaty power and the removal power, more so than the district court in
Leu, it is important to look at what the treaties purported to do. It
appears that the plain text of the treaties enable the President to remove
United
438.
439.
440.
441.

States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)).
E.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345-46 (2006).
VCLT, supra note 259, art. 31(1).
Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1209-10 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.3 (distinguishing private enforceability and self-

execution).
442. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1209-10. Unlike the Boundary Commissioner, Shurtleff
"involved a general power to appoint a subordinate for whose conduct the appointing authority
was responsible." Carrier v. Beck, 285 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Ark. 1955).
443. Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352-56 (1958); see also FEDERAL PROCEDURE,
LAWYERS EDITION § 2:30 (2008) (outlining the President's power to remove commissioners).
444. Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
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the U.S. Commissioner only in limited circumstances. Article IX of the
1908 Treaty provides for vacancies on the IBC "by reason of the death,
resignation, or other disability of a Commissioner." 4 4 5 Article IV of the
1925 Treaty clearly states that new commissioners are to be appointed
"upon the death, resignation, or other disability" of the
Commissioner. 44 6 No other provision for removal is provided in either
of the Treaties, and the principle of expressio unium est exclusio
alterius counsels that other removals are, therefore, prohibited.4 4 7
Though Shurtleff directs against using this maxim to infer life tenure,
this Article has already noted the questionable applicability of Shurtleff
as precedent. 44 8 Yet even if Shurtleff were controlling, the claim is not
that the Commissioner must have life tenure because, instead, a court
could limit tenure for good behavior. In any case, removal could
always be effected through the President's termination of the Treaties,
4 49
rendering a strict reliance on Shurtleff unnecessary and unjustifiable.
In addition, the Treaties are not "silent" on the issue of removal
because they contemplate vacancies. Such contemplation is evident
from comparison of the IBC Treaties to other contemporaneous U.S.Canadian treaties regarding binational bodies. The 1903 Alaskan
Boundary Treaty, for example, included a similar removal section to the
IBC Treaties except that it also included a "refusal to act" provision,
which is closer to an "at will" standard than the type of "good cause"
standard that the 1908 and 1925 Treaties seem, at a minimum, to
create. 4 50 Treaty negotiators and the ratifying Senate in 1908 and 1925
were thus aware of such an alternative.
451
In addition, the IJC, created by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty,
provides relevant context for the 1908 Treaty. The structure of the IJC
was similar to the IBC in that a board composed of an even number of
representatives from the United States and Canada led the commission.
However, whereas the IBC Treaty included the language discussed
445. 1908 Treaty, supra note 74, art. IX.
446. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. IV.
447. A possible counterargument is that the treaties do not address removal, that they instead
address appointment. Such a counterargument is plausible for the 1908 Treaty alone, but the
language of the 1925 Treaty is more certain and seems to contemplate a closed set of reasons of
removal. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text (questioning the precedential power of
Shurtlefi).
449. See supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text (suggesting the weakness of Shurtleff as
a precedent); infra notes 490-92 and accompanying text (discussing the President's options
besides firing Schomack).
450. See Alaska Boundary Treaty, supra note 72, art. I (describing the appointment and
dismissal of commissioners).
451. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 152.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

above regarding the conditions under which a Commissioner to the IiBC
would be removed, no such conditions were included in the IJC, which
discusses appointment procedures but is truly silent on removal. In
effect, IJC Commissioners are removable by their respective
governments. 4 52 These other treaties existing alongside the IBC
Treaties guide not only the textual inquiry but the inquiry into the
"negotiation and drafting history of the treaty" as well.
The postratification understanding of the IBC Treaties, particularly
the understanding contemporaneous with the Treaties entering into
force, also shows that the commissioners were supposed to be insulated
from removal. Otto H. Tittman, appointed by Theodore Roosevelt in
1909 as the first U.S. Commissioner to the IBC, served into a third
administration until his retirement in 1915.4 53 E.L. Jones, who
President Harding appointed, served under three presidents until his
death in 1929. 4 54 Even when commissioners were replaced at that time,
the position was often not political; when Commissioner Jones died, for
example, President Hoover replaced him with James H. Van Wagenen,
an engineer with the IBC for the previous nineteen years. 45 5 Such an
appointment demonstrated an understanding that, structurally and
normatively, the IBC Commissioners were supposed to be independent
experts making decisions insulated from politics.
Such an appointment furthers the conclusion that in considering the
object and purpose of the treaty, arguably the entire reason that the
United States and Canada entered into the Treaties was to depoliticize
the border. At times, until the definitive settling of the boundary
following the 1925 Treaty, the disputed boundary issue almost brought
Canada and the United States to the "brink of war." 4 56 Historically,
boundary commissioners were expected to perform their duties
impartially, and this was the understanding of the President and the
Senate at the times that the IBC Treaties were ratified.4 5 7 Such logic is
not an anachronistic motivation; this is also a modem reason for
delegating power-choosing expertise over politics. 4 58 The choice to
452. See WILLOUGHBY, supra note 84, at 18-19 (highlighting the history of political
appointments to the IJC commissioner posts on both sides of the border).
453. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ON
THE LAKE OF THE WOODS REFERENCE 140 & n.2 (1917).
454. THOMPSON & RANDALL, supra note 7, at 73.
455. Named on Boundary Commission, supra note 47, at 6.
456. McEwen Address, supra note 35, at 1.
457. The Treaty of Ghent, supra note 67; Alaska Boundary Treaty, supra note 72.
458. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
223 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1968) (1914) (emphasizing the
value of technical decisionmaking); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties,Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2378-79 (2006) (considering the virtues of an
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have an even number of Commissioners further reflects the desire to
insulate Commissioners from politics and further cooperation.
The de-politicizing goal of the Treaties can also relate to the
previously discussed question of self-execution. As the Court explained
in Medellin, "[t]he point of a non-self-executing treaty is that it
'addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court."' 4 5 9 Yet, the IBC Treaties are addressed precisely to move away
from the political department, providing insulation from political
pressures. This is what the Eighth Circuit in Pettibone recognized in
460
using the boundary set by the IBC as a rule of decision.
Given the foregoing analysis, the 1908 and 1925 Treaties can serve as
a theoretical limitation on the President's power to remove the U.S.
Commissioner to the IBC. The Treaties are self-executing and,
therefore, directly enforceable as U.S. law. 4 6 1 They contemplate a
limitation on the removal of the U.S. Commissioner such that he can
only be removed "by reason of . . . death, resignation, or other
disability." 4 62 And because the Commissioner is an inferior officer,
there is no constitutional malady with such a removal limitation,
particularly given the understandable desire for independence from the
executive.
V.

WHAT IF THE PRESIDENT IGNORES

HIs

OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY COMMISSION TREATIES?

If the 1908 and 1925 Treaties operate as a limit on the President's
removal power over the U.S. Commissioner-in the same way that a
congressional statute may limit the removal of a commissioner of an
independent agency-what are the effects of this limit? Put another
way, "so what"? Unlike a duly passed law with which the President
must comply, though the Constitution does not speak to "the question of
who has the power to suspend or terminate treaties ... it is generally
accepted that the President has such power, without the advice and
consent of the Senate, based on the President's established
constitutional authority to conduct the foreign affairs of the United

independent bureaucracy); cf Keith Werhan, The NeoclassicalRevival in Administrative Law, 44
ADMIN. L. REv. 567, 583-84 (1992) (noting that agency claims of expertise lose power as the
agency's work becomes more political and less technical).
459. Medellfn v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1363 (2008) (quoting Foster v. Nelson, 27 U.S. 253,
314 (1829)).
460. Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., 120 F.2d 850, 854-56 (8th Cir. 1941).
461. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing removal power jurisprudence).
462. See supra notes 434-60 and accompanying text (considering the original treaty texts).
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States," 463 though this view is certainly not a consensus. Under such
reasoning, perhaps the effect of the removal limitation is nil.
A. The Leu Litigation and Structural Concerns
One way in which a finding that the removal violated the 1908 and

1925 Treaties would have serious consequences is if Commissioner
Schornack were able to successfully sue for reinstatement to his job at
the IBC. Such a suit could have serious ramifications for notions of
executive power, the removal power, treaties, and separation of powers.
464
It could also serve as a deterrent for future administrations.
While it may seem that Commissioner Schornack's removal would
necessarily provide him with the ability to bring this suit, defining his

cause of action may prove so difficult that it may ultimately prevent him
from successfully challenging his removal. Assuming, as argued above,
that the U.S. Commissioner is an inferior officer,465 Commissioner
Schomack would be unable to challenge his removal through the
procedure available to most federal employees: the Merit Systems
Protection Board.4 66 A fired federal employee or officer could typically

bring constitutional claims for a due process property interest in
continued employment, or a due process liberty interest in remaining
free from incorrect reputation damaging stigma. 467 However, though
such claims are potentially implicated on the facts of Schornack's
removal,4 6 8 they too are likely unavailable to the fired
469
Commissioner.

Commissioner Schornack probably cannot bring a due process claim
based on either a property or liberty interest in his former position as
463. WESTON ET AL., supra note 364, at 244.
464. To the extent that Schornack also challenged his removal as a Commissioner to the UC,
it could also result in him garnering significant back pay. See supra note 123 (noting
Schomack's pre-firing salary).
465. See discussion supra Part III (considering the IBC treaties' treatment of commissioners).
466. In 1990 Congress passed the Civil Service Due Process Amendments, with the purpose
of granting appeal rights in adverse personnel actions to most members of the excepted service.
See Civil Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (1990) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (2006)). However, an officer like the Commissioner is still excluded from the
CSRA and cannot bring an action to the Board challenging his removal. See id. § 751 l(b)(3).
467. See infra notes 470-73 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's approach
to property and its deprivation).
468. See supra Part I1.B (outlining the facts of the Schornack case).
469. A third type of claim that a fired federal employee could bring is a claim that her firing
violated her First Amendment right to free speech. This path is, however, likely unavailable to a
fired IBC Commissioner because she would likely not enjoy these protections as a
"policymaking" employee. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (discussing when
party affiliation is an appropriate consideration); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S 347, 367 (1980) (noting
the difficulty of determining who is a "policymaker").
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IBC Commissioner. Property interests in employment are statutory, not
constitutional, entitlements. 4 70
The Supreme Court has broadly
4
7
interpreted "property" protection, 1 but a key distinction between the
IBC Commissioner position and that of the cases in which the Court has
found property protection is that the IBC Commissioner is unpaid. It
would thus be difficult for Schornack to conceptualize exactly what
"property" was taken from him through the wrongful firing. It would
also be difficult for Schornack to show that his removal was so
stigmatizing that his removal deprived him of a constitutionally
protected "liberty" interest. A series of Supreme Court cases regarding
liberty deprivation have created a standard that requires a former
employee claiming a liberty violation to demonstrate damage to
reputation coupled with loss of employment. 4 72 Courts construing this
requirement typically find that a performance-related dismissal is not
enough to invoke "liberty" protections, and the plaintiff must show that
the firing agency make publicly damaging statements that included
charges such as dishonesty, immorality, or criminality. 47 3 On the facts
of the removal of Commissioner Schornack, which occurred with
relatively little public comment, it is difficult to see how he could make
these claims.
Finally, it is unlikely that Commissioner Schornack could ground his
cause of action in the 1908 and 1925 Treaties. Though the Treaties
create substantive removal protection, 474 they do not provide a cause of
action. This was the ground for the Leu district court's decision. 47 5 It
stems from the Supreme Court's statements that "[e]ven when treaties
are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the
background presumption is that '[i]nternational agreements, even those
directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights
or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts."' 4 76 The
470. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (noting the statutory
basis of property rights).
471. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (noting the procedural
protections to property under the Fourteenth Amendment).
472. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (noting that a privately communicated
firing does not damage reputation); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (discussing
reputation as one of a number of interests); Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 (evaluating whether the
discharge seriously damages petitioner's standing in the community).
473. See, e.g., Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 630 (2d Cir.
1996) (outlining the type of statements that would invoke "liberty" protection); Portman v.
County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no property right

infringement).
474. See discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing how the Treaties insulate the IBC

Commissioner from politics).
475. Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1209-10 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
476. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.3 (2008) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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Treaties themselves are thus not strong candidates for a source for
Schornack's cause of action.
If Commissioner Schomack did possess a cause of action, 477 the
doctrinal problems with the President's actions are particularly salient;
however, even if Schornack did not possess a cause of action to
challenge his removal, there are reasons to question the propriety of the
Administration's actions. The fact that the removal may have violated a
treaty also has consequences for domestic statutory and constitutional
law. In other words, considering the self-executing nature of the
Treaties, it is inherently worthy of discussion if the President broke the
law. Even conceding the executive power argument that the President
has the unilateral power to terminate a treaty-and there is serious
debate on this issue-the executive power theory claims that Article II,
Section 1 gives the President this termination power unless another
constitutional requirement says otherwise. 47 8 Thus, again conceding
broad executive power, with respect to unilateral termination that
complies with the terms of a treaty, the President could terminate a
treaty at will. 4 79 By the terms of the 1925 Treaty, either State-party can
terminate the authority of the Commissioners "upon twelve months'
written notice" to the other party. 4 80 The issue that may constrain a
President's ability to terminate a treaty, however-even for subscribers
to broad executive power-is if another constitutional constraint comes
into play.
Article VI commands that self-executing treaties are the "supreme
law of the land. 48 1 Further, as a result of the President's Article II duty
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, 4 8 2 the President
cannot suspend the operation of a constitutionally valid law. 4 8 3 The
combination of the Supremacy Clause, a self-executing treaty, and the
Take Care Clause, thus counsels that the President should not have the
power to supersede self-executing treaties in violation of their terms. 484

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987)).
477. Schornack has also claimed that his cause of action is grounded in his role as a fiduciary
of the IBC and the obligations in the treaties creating it. While this may provide the best
likelihood of being able to stay in court, it is less clear how he would challenge his removal
through such a claim. See Motion for Reconsideration on an Expedited Basis or Alternatively
Certification for Appeal at 3-6, Leu, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C07-0510).
478. Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1231 (2005).
479. Id.
480. 1925 Treaty, supra note 97, art. V.
481. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
482. Id. art. I, § 3.
483. Ramsey, supra note 478, at 1231-32.
484. Id.
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This is one of the structural concerns that the Schornack firing
implicates.
The other potential concern that the firing raises is a more general
attack on domestic agency and commission independence. Neutrality
and expertise in bureaucratic decisionmaking are themes of
administrative law and classic justifications for delegating to
independent agencies. 4 85 So, while this Article details how the
Administration's actions are a threat to bilateral commissions and
international agencies, of which there are relatively few, the threat may
also extend to independent agencies housed in the executive branch, of
which there are very many. 486 Depoliticization is a classic good
governance value for agencies whose missions necessarily require some
separation from political decisionmaking.
Politicization is not
inherently bad and is, in fact, often expected. The problem is when the
executive branch pretends and claims it is acting with some modicum of
impartiality but instead politicizes traditionally independent agencies,
organizations, or personnel.4 87 Such concerns do not exist only in the
abstract as there are other examples-namely, U.S. attorney firings,
politicization of science, and DOJ hiring-in which it could be argued
that the Bush Administration deemphasized traditionally-important
4 88
impartiality and expertise in favor of politicization.
There are actions that President Bush could have taken to allay these
structural fears, particularly regarding the separation of powers value of
accountability. Any one of a number of potential actions could have
simultaneously complied with the Supremacy Clause, the Take Care
Clause, and the IBC Treaties. The most straightforward action that the
President could have taken would have been to comply with the terms
of the 1925 Treaty and provide Canada with twelve-months notice that
the United States intended to withdraw from the Treaty. Such clear

485. See, e.g., Herbert Kaufman, Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public
Administration, 50 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1057, 1060-61 (1956) (discussing the benefits of neutral
governance structures).
486. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2008-2009, supra note 144, at 363-568.
487. See generally David. C. Weiss, In Defense of the Post-PartisanPresident: Toward the
Boundary between 'Partisan'Advantage and 'Political' Choice, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssr.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1436886) (discussing the
concept of the post-partisan presidency).
488. See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY
OF GOOD GOVERNMENT 163-79 (2007) (concerning the Environmental Protection Agency);
Weiss, supra note 20 (questioning the constitutionality of Department of Justice firings under
George W. Bush); Office of the Inspector Gen. & Office of Prof I Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice Honors
Program and Summer Law Intern Program (June 24, 2008) (reviewing politicization in the
Department of Justice).
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behavior may have had positive benefits from an international
perspective. 4 89 In addition, the political cost for such a decision would
have been borne by the executive branch-where it belongs for a
presidential decision to terminate a treaty-rather than the judicial
branch, which is where it ends up when federal courts are forced to
weigh in on issues that implicate both political and separation of powers
concerns.
Second, President Bush could have gone through political channels
and worked with Canada to apply pressure to Commissioner Schornack
through the IBC itself. Indeed, if the IBC's determination was beyond
its treaty mandate as the Government subsequently claimed,4 9 ° perhaps
by working through political channels the Canadian Section would have
reconsidered its decision, as it has now done following Commissioner
Schornack's removal. 4 9 1 Third, the executive branch could have
announced that it would no longer fund the IBC and taken the political
consequences of such a decision. Fourth, though more debatable,
President Bush could have, perhaps, unilaterally withdrawn from the
1925 Treaty by providing only immediate notice. Such action may not
492
satisfy the entire basket of Article II, Article VI, and Treaty concerns,
but it would have more adequately supported the structural separation of
powers issues that arise when the executive branch acts in a way to
undermine the Senate's treaty power without opening itself to political
cost. Finally, the President could have applied political pressure to
Schornack and then not fired him if he chose to do what he thought
necessary to comply with the Treaties. This would have then forced the
President to decide whether to withdraw from the Treaty altogether.
Choosing between an openly political removal and acceptance of
Schornack's claims to independence is the more difficult and potentially
damaging political choice that the Treaties may have been seeking to
force political leaders to make.
Despite these possibilities, the course of action that the
Administration chose is the most troubling. Unlike renouncing a treaty
by acting in violation of the agreement, "it is critical to see the
difference from termination in accordance with a treaty's terms: that is
489. See infra notes 507-18 and accompanying text (considering the effect of respecting

treaties on a nation's international reputation).
490. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 109, at 32.
491. Id. at 20.
492. See supra notes 478-84 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional issues
implicated in treaty withdrawal). It is unlikely that such an action would be valid in international
law because under the VCLT, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, through which a treaty can be
unilaterally terminated for changed circumstances, may not be invoked to terminate a boundary
treaty. TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 361.
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faithful execution, since nothing in the Treaty requires it to remain in
effect."-49 3 Structurally, the problems with the Administration's actions
are readily apparent. Balance and accountability are core separation of
powers principles. 494 To the extent that the President acted contrary to a
self-executing treaty and his Article II duties, this action threatens
balance between the executive branch's broad power in foreign affairs
and the Senate's constitutionally-explicit role in treaty-making. Further,
to the extent that Schornack was fired without an admission that such
action was a renunciation or termination of the Treaty, this action
damages the value of accountability because the administration is
seeking to have it both ways: violate the Treaty but avoid the negative
consequences of ending a treaty that has proved valuable and is
prospectively desirable.
B. FurtherNormative Considerations:Separation of Powers, Foreign
Affairs, and InternationalLaw
Regardless of whether Commissioner Schornack retains a cause of
action, there are domestic, constitutional, and international reasonsdomestically, from a constitutional structure perspective, and
internationally-from the perspective of the rule of law and U.S.
commitment to its treaties, that we should be concerned if the
President removes an officer that he had agreed by treaty to leave in
office barring death, disability, or impeachable offense.
As a primary concern, the President's removal of Commissioner
Schornack undermines the Senate's understanding of the IBC-and by
extension the Supremacy Clause-by essentially changing the
Commission's nature more than one hundred years after the Senate
approved its original form. Professor Kaikobad has noted that one of
the key reasons that the Jay Treaty was not only novel but successful,
was that the commissioners that it created had "the duty (and power) to
decide the dispute impartially and with reference to principles of law
and evidence." 49 5 "What was significant" about the beginning of the
period of U.S.-Canadian relations around 1908, "was the effort to
institutionalize and depoliticize the mechanisms of conflict
resolution." 49 6 The IBC, in fact, was the "first important initiative"
established to depoliticize certain aspects of Anglo-American
relations.4 97 As recently as 2002, two commentators reported that
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

Ramsey, supra note 478, at 1232.
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1835-36 (1996).
KAIKOBAD, supra note 64, at 63 (emphasis added).
THOMPSON & RANDALL, supra note 7, at 72.
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"[t]he IBC's mandate has always been reasonably specific and technical
in nature, a fact that kept its operation relatively free of controversy and
public debate." 4 98 Additionally, "during Commissioner Schornack's
tenure, the U.S. Government had not exercised influence or control over
the day-to-day operations of the Commission." 4 99
Thus, by
dramatically altering the independent nature of the IBC, the executive
branch is essentially operating under a treaty that is materially different
from the treaty that the Senate ratified. This alteration undermines the
importance of the Senate in the treaty-making structure that the
Constitution requires, in addition to any questions related to efforts to
focus
on administrative politicization in favor of expert
5 00
decisionmaking.
The President's unilateral reinterpretation of the removal provisions
of the 1908 and 1925 Treaties further affects the separation of powers
value of balance. The constitutional value of balance between the
branches is a central separation of powers concern. 50 1 Many of the
commentators that have praised Morrison have done so because of its
functionalist, balancing approach to separation of powers that seems
committed to the core Article II powers but is also concerned with
executive aggrandizement.5 °2 It is difficult to see how approving of
the executive's questionable reinterpretation of a treaty that has
insulated the U.S. Commissioner from removal for more than one
hundred years serves the value of balance. In the same way that the
executive branch recently undermined congressional authority through
its use of signing statements, 50 3 this removal undercuts the historical
understanding of the proper Article I role for the legislature by
changing the terms of a political bargain to which the Senate agreed
without any input from the legislature.
Finally, there are reasons to be particularly concerned that the
President chose to remove the Commissioner but claimed that he was
498. Id. at 73.
499. Leu v. Int'l Boundary Comm'n, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
500. See supra notes 485-88 and accompanying text (highlighting the breadth of recent
politicization).
501. See Flaherty, supra note 494, at 1821, 1828-32.
502. See, e.g., id. at 1835-36; Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 523-24
(1987). But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 712 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Greene,
supra note 289, at 175; Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A FormalisticPerspective on Why
the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 313, 345-46 (1989).
503. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements
Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 13 (2007); Sofia E. Biller, Note, Flooded by the
Lowest Ebb: CongressionalResponses to PresidentialSigning Statements and Executive Hostility
to the Operationof Checks and Balances, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1088 (2008).
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doing so within the bounds of the 1908 and 1925 Treaties. The
constitutional tenet of separation of powers was "deliberately so
structured to assure full, vigorous, and open debate on the great issues
affecting the people." 50 4 The Supreme Court recognized as much in
Morrison.50 5 The purpose of such a public debate is to ensure that the
primary check on the removal power, the political check, functions
properly, which cannot occur if actions and decision-making processes
are not subject to public scrutiny. 50 6 If the President assures the public,
courts, and Canada that he is following the treaty, yet undermines the
ability of courts to make that determination, it is doubtful that a
"vigorous" debate will occur. The fate of Dennis Schomack will likely
not activate the public in the same way that a unilateral withdrawal from
a successful, one-hundred-year-old treaty with the United States' closest
ally could. That is precisely the constitutional concern.
In terms of international law, the implications of the subversion of the
1908 and 1925 Treaties are equally salient. It is neither accidental nor
unimportant that a treaty created the IBC. A primary purpose of
international law for international bodies is law's institutionalization
function. 50 7 The fact that treaties created the IBC institutionalizes the
Commission. International law lends the IBC a "permanence and
seriousness that reflects a commitment by the sides to peacefully
settling future disputes about the border." 50 8 As Professors Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes have explained in describing their
"managerial model" of compliance with international law, one of the
purposes of international bodies can be to monitor State-parties'
Managerial compliance is
compliance with their agreements. 50 9
particularly compelling when thinking about international bodies that
enforce borders. It is because of the concern that a boundary treaty will
not conclusively settle a boundary dispute "that many coterminous
States turn to arbitration and adjudication to resolve problems involving
the meaning and scope of boundary provisions and treaties. '"510 In
effectively rejecting the removal limitations in the Treaty-without
explicitly rejecting them-the United States has undermined the
expected benefits from the managerial model. To the extent that the
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

509.
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IBC was able to independently monitor the State-parties' compliance
with the 1908 and 1925 Treaties, its ability to do that is now limited if
the U.S. Commissioner knows that a determination adverse to the
American political powers-that-be will result in removal.
While there are technical results that effectively renouncing the 1925
Treaty may have, another reason that it matters if the executive branch
has changed the rules that the 1908 and 1925 Treaties created-again,
without formally renouncing them, but instead by invoking broad
presidential removal power-is for U.S. reputation. Andrew Guzman
has emphasized the role of reputation in international law and the key
role that a State's reputational concerns can and should play in its
decision to comply with international law. Under Professor Guzman's
reputation-based theory of compliance with international law, treaties
between friendly powers when an informal agreement would serve the
"coordination game" just as well may be for the purpose of creating
additional certainty or predictability that informal agreements cannot
provide. 5 11 The boundary treaties may have simply been one of these
coordination games; however, their emphasis on pre-commitment and
de-politicization implies that they may have been something more.
They were likely an effort to bring additional certainty to the U.S.Canadian relationship regarding the border.
Looking at the Treaties through Guzman's reputational lens, the Bush
Administration's efforts to undermine the 1925 Treaty are troubling.
Just as there was concern following the often-cited U.S. termination of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 5 12 there are reputational harms if the
United States is not seen as adhering to its treaty commitments. While
such harm may be less for such a low profile issue as boundaries, it is
arguably worse if the United States cannot even follow these basic
commitments with one of its closest allies. It may also be worse for
U.S. reputation if other countries view the United States as failing to
follow a treaty to which it claims to be adhering rather than rejecting the
treaty outright. This is particularly true because, according to the
VCLT, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, through which a treaty can be
unilaterally terminated due to changed circumstances, may not be
invoked to terminate a boundary treaty. 5 13 Thus reinterpreting a treaty
511. GUZMAN, supra note 24, at 27.
512. See e.g., Joshua P. O'Donnell, The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Debate: Time for Some
Clarificationof the President'sAuthority to Terminate a Treaty, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1601 (2002) (exploring the legal issues surrounding a president's unilateral withdrawal from a
treaty); Emily K. Penney, Comment, Is That Legal?: The United States' Unilateral Withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1287 (2002) (discussing the legality
of the United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty).
513. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER
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to effectively renounce it is even more problematic when the option of
unilateral withdrawal at international law is not available.
In discussing reputation, Guzman describes the Antarctic Treaty, for
example, as one that was drafted to solve a coordination game because
the states' desire to preserve Antarctica as a military-free research zone
was an equilibrium that had already been reached. 5 14 "Looking forward
from the time of the signing, however, it is plausible that the parties had
concerns about how the importance of Antarctica and therefore the
payoffs to the parties might change." 5 15 By establishing a treaty instead
of more informal norms, the parties addressed the possibility that the
Antarctic coordination game would become a prisoner's dilemma. Just
like environmental issues and their characteristics of a prisoner's
dilemma, 5 16 one of the purposes of establishing the IBC was to take
defecting choices away from politically influenced branches in each
country. Such a treaty should have been, and was, easy to comply with
for a long period of time. According to Professor Guzman, "[W]e can
predict that a state's decision to comply with a legal rule will enhance
its reputation when the nonreputational payoffs counsel violation and
the state's existing reputation (as other states perceived it) is insufficient
to cause observing states to expect compliance." 5 17 He continues, "A
violation will harm a state's reputation when the non-reputational
payoffs, combined with the state's existing reputation, predict
compliance." 5 18 Thus, given the actual benefits to the United States of
having an IBC that enforces a neutrally-administered border, Canada
has likely expected U.S.-compliance, and the fact that the United States
decided not to comply with the Treaty in removing Commissioner
Schornack is likely a negative for U.S. reputation and further counsels
against finding the removal allowable from a policy perspective.
VI. CONCLUSION

"There are no intrinsically good or bad boundaries.... A boundary,
like the human skin, may have diseases of its own or may reflect the
illnesses of the body." 5 19 Like skin, however, a necessary condition for
a "good" boundary is that it is intact. Two treaties established the IBC
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a century ago to finally settle and maintain a border that had been a
source of acrimony since the Revolutionary War. Perhaps the greatest
testament to the IBC's success was the scant attention that it received
until recently.
The unprecedented removal of the U.S. Commissioner is prohibited
by its founding treaties. Whether the Commissioner and his staff are a
part of the U.S. Government is a difficult question, but it seems likely
that they are; even if they are not, such a conclusion counsels even
further against a presidential removal power over the Commissioner.
Regardless, there are consequences in both constitutional and
international law for the President's actions. Domestically, on the
constitutional front, we should be concerned when the executive branch
advances its own, untenable treaty interpretation in a way that leads to
executive aggrandizement at the expense of the Senate and the
separation of powers value of independence, particularly when such
actions
threaten
independence
and expertise
in delegated
decisionmaking. At the international law level, we should be troubled
by the fact that the executive branch has ignored its international
obligations and done so in a particularly nefarious way, without owning
up to its abandonment of its purported commitments. Given the IBC's
"grass-mowing" function, removing the U.S. Commissioner may truly
be the highest-hanging fruit of executive branch politicization. Perhaps
a simple change in Administration has already remedied this problem.
If not, Congress could always enact a removal limitation on the
Commissioner, settling any doubt that border decisions should be made
removed from interest group politics.

